Bauman’s theory of freedom shows how freedom should be understood as a differential capacity of social positions. Consequently, Bauman treats freedom (of action) and power as two sides of the same coin implying that the freedom of one actor will often restrict the possibilities of action of others. The paper further develops such a social and relational approach by arguing that freedom is also based on emotional energy and not merely on priveleges and power (cf. Bauman). Agency cannot be taken for granted as a generic feature of humans beings (cf. Layder, Bauman, Campbell) founded in consciousnes and intentionality (Fuchs). In a differential and generative sense freedom/agency is based on emotional energy. For example, to act personally, cooperately with others or on behalf on institutions individuals need feeling self-confidence, trust or loyalty (Barbalet). Such emotions are resources inmplicated in processes of power in which freedom/agency is more or less generated and re-generated. Such forms of emotinal energy are a crucial power resource by being essential for bringing more conventionally understood power resources in to play, the paper concludes