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The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe

Publikation: Forskning - fagfællebedømtTidsskriftartikel

Standard

The Uneven Legal Push for Europe : Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe. / Wind, Marlene; Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg; Rotger, Gabriel Pons.

I: European Union Politics, Bind 10, Nr. 1, 2009, s. 63-88.

Publikation: Forskning - fagfællebedømtTidsskriftartikel

Harvard

Wind, M, Martinsen, DS & Rotger, GP 2009, 'The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe' European Union Politics, bind 10, nr. 1, s. 63-88. DOI: 10.1177/1465116508099761

APA

Wind, M., Martinsen, D. S., & Rotger, G. P. (2009). The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe. European Union Politics, 10(1), 63-88. DOI: 10.1177/1465116508099761

Vancouver

Wind M, Martinsen DS, Rotger GP. The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe. European Union Politics. 2009;10(1):63-88. Tilgængelig fra, DOI: 10.1177/1465116508099761

Author

Wind, Marlene ; Martinsen, Dorte Sindbjerg ; Rotger, Gabriel Pons. / The Uneven Legal Push for Europe : Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe. I: European Union Politics. 2009 ; Bind 10, Nr. 1. s. 63-88

Bibtex

@article{ad5656e0041311deb05e000ea68e967b,
title = "The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation when National Courts go to Europe",
abstract = "National courts have been key players in the legal push for Europe, though notably to varying degrees. This paper examines the persisting variations in the referral rates of national courts and the underlying causal factors, aiming to better understand why some member states' courts have been more reluctant to join in the legal push for Europe. By using econometric methods, it challenges the modified neofunctionalist argument that the extent of intra-EC trade explains the referral practice of the individual member states. Majoritarian democracy is hypothesized as a causal factor in the low referral rates for some of the EU member states. Key characteristics of majoritarian democracy versus constitutional democracy are outlined and the former is further detailed by means of two case studies: Denmark and the UK. Finally, a panel data analysis is conducted and finds evidence of a negative impact of majoritarian democracy on the number of referrals. The paper concludes that, owing to the uneven legal push for Europe, some member states and their citizens remain at arms' length from the legal integration process - and, in consequence, from the full impact of European integration.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, causality, legal integration, majoritarian democracy, national courts",
author = "Marlene Wind and Martinsen, {Dorte Sindbjerg} and Rotger, {Gabriel Pons}",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1177/1465116508099761",
volume = "10",
pages = "63--88",
journal = "European Union Politics",
issn = "1465-1165",
publisher = "Sage Publications Ltd.",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Uneven Legal Push for Europe

T2 - European Union Politics

AU - Wind,Marlene

AU - Martinsen,Dorte Sindbjerg

AU - Rotger,Gabriel Pons

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - National courts have been key players in the legal push for Europe, though notably to varying degrees. This paper examines the persisting variations in the referral rates of national courts and the underlying causal factors, aiming to better understand why some member states' courts have been more reluctant to join in the legal push for Europe. By using econometric methods, it challenges the modified neofunctionalist argument that the extent of intra-EC trade explains the referral practice of the individual member states. Majoritarian democracy is hypothesized as a causal factor in the low referral rates for some of the EU member states. Key characteristics of majoritarian democracy versus constitutional democracy are outlined and the former is further detailed by means of two case studies: Denmark and the UK. Finally, a panel data analysis is conducted and finds evidence of a negative impact of majoritarian democracy on the number of referrals. The paper concludes that, owing to the uneven legal push for Europe, some member states and their citizens remain at arms' length from the legal integration process - and, in consequence, from the full impact of European integration.

AB - National courts have been key players in the legal push for Europe, though notably to varying degrees. This paper examines the persisting variations in the referral rates of national courts and the underlying causal factors, aiming to better understand why some member states' courts have been more reluctant to join in the legal push for Europe. By using econometric methods, it challenges the modified neofunctionalist argument that the extent of intra-EC trade explains the referral practice of the individual member states. Majoritarian democracy is hypothesized as a causal factor in the low referral rates for some of the EU member states. Key characteristics of majoritarian democracy versus constitutional democracy are outlined and the former is further detailed by means of two case studies: Denmark and the UK. Finally, a panel data analysis is conducted and finds evidence of a negative impact of majoritarian democracy on the number of referrals. The paper concludes that, owing to the uneven legal push for Europe, some member states and their citizens remain at arms' length from the legal integration process - and, in consequence, from the full impact of European integration.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - causality

KW - legal integration

KW - majoritarian democracy

KW - national courts

U2 - 10.1177/1465116508099761

DO - 10.1177/1465116508099761

M3 - Journal article

VL - 10

SP - 63

EP - 88

JO - European Union Politics

JF - European Union Politics

SN - 1465-1165

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 10827479