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Europeanisation of Security Sector Reform in the European Union's Enlargement Zone:

Informal Institutions and the Implementation of Decaf in Poland and Turkey

Background and Focus

It was a historic event when twelve new countries joined the European Union (EU) during the two consecutive enlargement waves of 2004 and 2007. Prior to their accession, all twelve followed rigorous reform programmes across multiple sectors in order to fulfil the EU conditionality for accession. A similar amount of EU influence is also felt by current applicant states, as they too are required to reform their legal structures along the lines of the *acquis* and resemble their counterparts who are EU members in many aspects of their institutional structure if they wish to join the club. The concept of 'Europeanisation' refers to such processes whereby EU 'rules, procedures, policy paradigms … and shared beliefs and norms' are 'incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies' of member and candidate states (Radaelli, 2003). However, the process of Europeanisation is seen to vary greatly in both depth and speed across candidate countries. This presents us with an empirical puzzle: Why do candidate countries subject to the same stimuli for change perform very differently when it comes to reform outcomes in terms of fundamental institutional change? For instance, how did the majority of central and east European states manage to successfully close down all negotiation chapters in just little more than a decade following years of authoritarian rule, whereas a country like Turkey, which has carried on a semi-democratic political tradition for several decades, albeit in the shadow of numerous military interferences, continues to go through a rather cumbersome experience with implementing EU-led reforms?

In order to address this puzzle, this study will focus on security sector reform as an instance of Europeanisation by comparing a previous and a current applicant state: Poland and Turkey. Although it is common practice for scholars of Europeanisation to base their studies on EU member states, the fact that the EU exerts a comparable degree of pressure on applicant states through accession conditionality and chapter negotiations makes Europeanisation a relevant field of study for applicant states as well (Grabbe, 2003; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005) Furthermore, security sector reform is a promising area for research, as the EU promotes the same model of reform to all candidate states, namely 'democratic control of the armed forces (Decaf) method' with dramatic differences in the levels of success for each country (Forster, 2001).

In very general terms, Decaf method involves the establishment of a series of constitutional constraints in the form of checks and balances for the regulation of the civil-military relations. The main objectives of this institutional framework are to guarantee the political neutrality of the security sector and to establish civilian supremacy over its decisions and actions. Central to this model is the idea of the shared responsibility of the executive and legislative branches of the government in

controlling and overseeing the armed forces (Caparini and Fluri, 2002) Whereas the executive branch is held responsible for establishing control over all military activity, the parliament assumes a supervisory role over both the executive and the military. Important pillars of reform along the model include the redefinition and legal separation of civil and military competence, parliamentary oversight of defence activities (especially the budget) as well as ensuring government discretion over all aspects of the security sector (Cizre, 2004). Since the 1990s, especially with the pressure exerted through EU and NATO membership requirements, Decaf has undisputedly emerged as the dominant method of security sector reform in the EU's enlargement zone and its formal requirements had to be met by all applicant states subject to the Copenhagen criteria (Cizre, 2004).

With Decaf being the 'required model' guiding security sector reform, one would expect 'processes of coercion' to lead to convergence among EU's applicant states with regard to the reform outcome (Schmidt, 2002). However, an initial look at the Polish and Turkish cases shows something else: Both countries have made the necessary formal institutional changes to resemble the Decaf model as a requirement of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria (Cizre, 2004); but as individual progress reports have shown, adoption of the Decaf method was coupled with varying degrees of democratisation of civil-military relations. Whereas Poland constitutes a successful case of Decaf, with a fast pace of adoption and successful alteration of power relations between the civil and military fold (Danopoulos & Zirker, 2002), Turkey is among the least successful cases in the region with the political weight of its armed forces remaining intact even with the adoption of the Decaf method (Cizre, 2004).

Research Question, Hypothesis and Potential Contribution

In the light of the empirical puzzle presented above, this study aims to address the following research question: Given the high incentives for institutional change due to accession conditionality as well as the actual adoption of a specific model of security sector reform promoted by the EU, which national mediating factors account for the differing degrees of democratisation in civil-military relations in the EU's former and current candidate countries? As we move up the ladder of abstraction, this research question appears as an instance of a broader question relating to the relationship between Europeanisation and national institutional outcome that still awaits convincing explanations: Given a common process as a powerful stimulus for change, such as the process of Europeanisation, which intervening variables provide an explanation for the observed variation in reform outcomes at the domestic level in the wider European region? At the theoretical level, these questions offer a promising way forward for further theorising Europeanisation. With regard to policy relevance, they appear as fundamental questions relating to EU's enlargement policy and to the adequacy of institutional templates that EU promotes in its region.

The new institutionalist theory offers a wide range of analytical tools for studying causal mechanisms between common stimuli for change and diverse outcomes of reform. More specifically, the historical institutionalist school, within which this study positions itself, appears as a strong body of thought for providing historically-grounded explanations by emphasising the role of endogenous sources of institutional change, path dependency, historical legacies, increasing returns, policy

inheritance, unintended consequences of reform as well as ideational factors such as policy paradigms (Hall & Taylor, 1996). According to historical institutionalism reform takes place in a world that is already filled with politically embedded institutions (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). Although once dominated by the punctuated equilibrium model, during the past decade, historical institutionalism has witnessed the emerging of fruitful studies that aim to develop new theories of gradual institutional change (i.e. Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). These recent theories on institutional change provide a good template for my study because of their emphasis on implementation as well as their theoretical strength in engaging with the dynamic nature of institutions that account for both stability and change.

However, a significant theoretical gap in historical institutionalism seems to be that the effects of informal institutions on reform processes have been largely overlooked. Studies which emphasise the role of factors such as reform capacity (Héritier et al, 2001), goodness of fit (Knill & Lenschow, 1998; Borzel, 1999; Borzel & Risse, 2000; Risse et. al., 2001) or veto players (Haverland, 2000) are common, but the hypothesis suggested by this proposal holds that focusing on the role of formal institutions alone may leave out key explanatory factors with regard to the reform processes in EU candidate countries. Despite being uncodified or implicit in nature, informal institutions are as effective in defining the rules of the game as formal institutions (March & Olsen 1989, North 1990, O'Donnell 1996, Helmke & Levitsky, 2006), so they possess an undeniably political character. For this reason, the proposed study questions the adequacy of recent approaches in historical institutionalism that place informal institutions in the cultural realm separate from the political (i.e. Streeck & Thelen 2005) and argues that the current scholarly knowledge on institutional change and stability would benefit considerably from the incorporation of informal institutions into contemporary institutionalist theories of change.

At the empirical level, instances of uneven implementation of security sector reform reveal that formal institutional changes do not fully account for the level of changes that we observe in the overall institutional structure, which not only refers to the 'specific characteristics of government institutions' and the 'overarching structures of the state', but also to the 'nation's normative social order' (Ikenberry, 1988). An initial look at the dynamics of security sector reform in Poland and Turkey suggests that informal institutions may have played an important role in bringing about the different levels of democratisation in these two countries even under similar formal models of institutional change. For instance, in the Turkish case, parliamentary debates on security-related issues appears as an area where formal measures of Decaf prove to be inadequate as the members of the Turkish Parliament continually resort to self-restraint and silence when such issues are on the agenda. Comparing to other areas of legislation, security issues are debated significantly less. Furthermore, both the governing and opposition parties usually accept the military budget without holding any real debate about the suggested programs or projects (Akyesilmen, 2010). This points to an underlying norm in Turkish politics: that it is the military that decides on matters of security policy and not the elected officials. In sharp contrast, the implementation stage of security sector reform in Poland was dominated by ideational shifts that enabled the consolidation of civilian empowerment. Following the adoption of Decaf, Poland demonstrates an example where the norm of civilian

empowerment no longer permits the persistence of 'concentrated model of executive authority' that used to dominate civil-military relations (Epstein, 2006).

In the light of these theoretical and empirical observations, and with the purpose of unravelling unexplored causal mechanisms, I argue for the necessity of studying informal institutions as an intervening variable between Europeanisation of security sector reform and the associated levels of democratisation in civil-military relations. By doing so, this study can contribute to the advancement of scientific knowledge on at least six dimensions that are especially relevant for the historical institutionalist literature on Europeanisation and institutional change. First and foremost, analysing the role of informal institutions as an intervening variable might uncover unexplored causal mechanisms of institutional change and contribute to the development of a more comprehensive historical institutionalist theory of gradual institutional change. Secondly, concerning the analysis of endogenous sources of change that is central for historical institutionalism, this study points to an interaction effect between the formal-legal and cognitive-normative structures during institutional change. Whereas different schools within institutional theory focus on either of these structures separately, the novel emphasis on their interaction might contribute to the much needed 'bridging' between different theoretical perspectives within new institutionalism (Hall, 2010). Thirdly, as central as the historical institutionalist emphasis on historical legacies may be for explaining divergent outcomes of institutional change under similar pressures, moving away from 'past legacies' and into the realm of informal institutions will allow for a more systematised analysis of national particularities without jeopardising the historical focus. Fourthly, when considered in terms of 'historical legacies', these national particularities almost exclusively appear as sources of stability rather than change. In contrast, conceptualising them as informal institutions gives them a more dynamic character as both causes and effects of political change. Fifth, because the study goes beyond reform as formal policy change and studies the actual process of enacting this change, it addresses a rather understudied stage of the policy cycle, that of implementation. And lastly, the study would contribute towards addressing a much significant gap identified by theorists of Europeanisation (i.e. Grabbe, 2003) with regard to the data available on cognitive-normative structures of EU applicant states. Such knowledge is crucial for understanding the broader implications of EU's influence beyond its borders.

Definitions and Theoretical Framework

There is no consensus in the institutionalist scholarship as to how political institutions are best defined (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). The working definition that I wish to employ for this study is a combination of the ones given by Hall (1986) and March and Olsen (1989), where institutions refer to all 'formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating procedures that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy' (Hall, 1986) as well as to 'norms', 'understandings and routines' that 'provide individuals with the appropriate course of action and which form the basis of legitimacy for implementing and enforcing those values' (March & Olsen, 1989). This combined approach to defining institutions serves a double purpose: that of emphasising the political character of institutions vested in the idea that institutions shape power structures among political

actors (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992) and of emphasising their close association with the 'logic of appropriateness' (McNamara, 2002). In other words, I agree with the historical institutionalist claim that institutions signify obligation. However, this obligatory character does not solely arise due to the existence of formal third party sanctioning as argued by Thelen and Steinmo (1992) but is also fed from more subtle forms of enforcement such as social templates that shape individual behaviour towards what is possible, appropriate and legitimate. For empirical grounding, we can turn to the previous example of the auto-silencing observed among Turkish MPs when it comes to debating security policy in the parliament. At this instance, where this auto-silencing signifies a tacit understanding shared by MPs that security policy is not a legitimate subject for political debate, we can identify an institution, regardless of whether the MPs expect third party sanctioning for defying this rule.

Furthermore, my study follows the footsteps of Streeck and Thelen (2005) in conceptualising institutions as 'regimes'. This approach highlights the ambiguous and politically embedded character of institutions, which makes them subject to interpretations and re-interpretations by both rule-makers and rule-takers at all times. In this sense, the meaning of institutions is never self-apparent but is constantly negotiated and defined by relevant actors. Streeck and Thelen (2005) argue that within each institutional regime, there is always a gap that emerges out of this unfixed meaning, which enables political actors to manipulate the institutional scene to their own advantage. This approach is especially relevant for my proposed study due to its focus on the phase of reform implementation, which refers to the way in which policy decisions are put into effect or are enacted (From & Stava, 1993). This means that much of the contestation for meaning of institutions comes to the fore during the implementation stage where public bureaucracies and judiciaries transform a rule into action thereby defining it in practice (Streeck & Thelen 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). There is however, one point of objection that needs to be made. The 'meaning gap' as conceptualised by Streeck and Thelen, is characterised by a political vacuum where agency above everything is decisive for the final institutional outcome. This brings to mind the rightful criticism raised by Thelen and Steinmo against Krasner's 'punctuated equilibrium model': the fact that 'institutions explain everything until they explain nothing' signifies a theoretical shortcoming (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). In order to restore the centrality of institutions for the institutional regime model, I argue not only for the necessity of acknowledging the existence of such a meaning gap, but also that of recognising that even this space is replete with informal institutions which continue to guide the behaviour of political actors within a given institutional regime.

Even though historical institutionalism acknowledges the possibility that some institutions are informal in nature, studies that incorporate informal institutions into their analyses remain to be limited (Culpepper, 2005; Helmke and Levitsky, 2006). The most common way of conceptualizing informal institutions in this stream of literature is to see them as mechanisms that contribute to path dependence and as 'second best options' for organizing political life when the formal structures prove to be inadequate (Meagher, 2007). In sharp contrast to such accounts, this study embraces institutions in their totality, claiming a central place for informal institutions alongside formal ones in explaining different reform outcomes. Even though common wisdom holds that studying informal institutions would be irrelevant for countries

with effective formal institutions, recent studies in political science (i.e. Lauth, 2004, Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, Leftwich, 2007), political economy (i.e. Culpepper, 2005) as well as classic works in the field of economy (i.e. North, 1990) provide convincing evidence that informal institutions are central for political and economic life regardless of the strength of formal institutional settings that they exist in[1]. In defining informal institutions, I follow Helmke and Levitsky (2006) that informal institutions refer to the rules that are 'created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels' as opposed to formal institutions that 'are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official'. It is necessary to note that 'unofficial' does not refer to 'non-state'. In this sense, informal institutions refer to rules and templates that are uncodified, implicit and tacit in nature as opposed to formal institutions that are explicitly codified in laws and other legal documents.

Another crucial definition relating to this study is that of the dependent variable, namely domestic political outcome in terms of overall institutional change. Even if the concept is widely used, it is also among the least elaborated concepts in historical institutionalism (Deeg, 2005). One explanation may be that in the shadow of 'path-dependent' change and its emphasis on stability, scholars of historical institutionalism did not find it very useful to conceptualise something they thought to be non-existent. Another explanation for this scholarly reluctance might be that something as huge as 'overall institutional change' was thought to happen only as a result of institutional breakdown as predicted by the punctuated equilibrium model. However, as current historical institutionalist theory strives to come up with better theoretical tools to engage with different kinds of political and institutional change (i.e. Streeck & Thelen 2005; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), it is more than crucial to provide a profound conceptualisation as to what should count as real/fundamental/off-path change. Guidelines in the literature are scarce; however I deem Deeg's (2005) conceptualisation of on-path and off-path change to be the best-suited one for the purposes of my study. In order to distinguish between these two types of change, Deeg conceptualizes 'path' as 'logic' where a new path is established with a new 'logic of action'. Given that all institutions are embedded within power relations that *actively* produce and/or reproduce them, new logics of action that trigger off-path change are those that emerge as a result of successful alteration of power relations within that institutional regime (Deeg, 2005). What this implies for the study of security sector reform is that successful reform outcomes as in the case of Poland are coupled with an alteration in prevailing power relations and the emergence of a new logic of action that signifies a more democratic approach to civil-military relations; whereas less successful outcomes, as in the case of Turkey, are coupled with the maintenance of the existing relations of power with regard to the positioning of the armed forces in the country's political life. In short, between the two countries I am looking at that have both experienced a strong political role for their security forces, only Poland has achieved civilian empowerment, thus off-path change.

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[1] This does not leave out the possibility that their impact on political outcomes might be different under strong and weak formal institutional settings. For a discussion, see the introductory chapter in Helmke and Levitsky (2006).

As stated earlier in the proposal, the major aim of this study is to study the role of informal institutions as an intervening variable between a common stimulus for change (Europeanisation) and a national political outcome (degrees of democratisation of civil-military relations). In order to study this relationship, I adopt the 'theory of gradual institutional change', suggested initially by Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and further developed by Mahoney and Thelen (2010). This framework emerges from within historical institutionalism, and constitutes one of the most promising theoretical initiatives for studying the impact of endogenous mechanisms on institutional change and stability. Its relevance for my study stems from its compatibility with the conceptualisation of institutions as regimes, its theoretical focus on the phase of reform/policy implementation as well as the dynamic character it assigns to institutions for being susceptible to both stability and change. Especially the last characteristic must be welcomed by the historical institutionalist tradition given the lack of middle-range theoretical tools developed by this school for studying endogenous dynamics of change (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992).

The theory of gradual institutional change positions itself against the 'punctuated equilibrium model' (Krasner, 1984) and criticises this once dominant framework for its inadequacy of conceptualising different modes of institutional change as well as for failing to account for endogenous sources of institutional change, that is, sources of change arising directly from within an institutional system (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). According to the latest version of this framework, institutional change does not solely take the form of 'displacement' as suggested by the punctuated equilibrium model, but can follow processes of layering, drift and conversion as well. Displacement refers to the introduction of new rules in place of the current ones and corresponds to the punctuated equilibrium model's conceptualisation of institutional change. Layering indicates a process whereby new rules are introduced alongside current ones even though they may entail a contradictory logic. Drift signifies the continuation of existing rules albeit with a change in their impact due to environmental shifts. Lastly, the process of conversion refers to a process whereby a change in the enactment/enforcement of an existing rule leads to institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

One of the major criticisms raised against the theory of gradual institutional change concerns the fact that the initial version of the theory, as established by Thelen and Steinmo, fail to go beyond a mere typology of institutional change. This is a rightful criticism and it stems from the observation that whereas the authors bring to the fore many more modes of change than had ever been envisaged by previous theorists within the same tradition, they do not establish theoretical links between these and what constitutes as real/fundamental change (Immergut and Anderson, 2008). In other words, the crucial theoretical arrow link that should define the nature of the relationship between different processes of change and the outcome regarding the overall institutional structure is missing from the picture. The same point of objection can also be raised to the newer version of this theory found in the volume edited by Mahoney and Thelen (2010). In the theoretical framework for gradual institutional change, it is somehow assumed by the authors that the four modes of change (displacement, layering, drift, conversion) are all capable of creating fundamental institutional transformations at all times. However, the theoretical shortcoming remains as to *when* each process should be expected to lead to stability,

inertia, on-path or off-path change. For instance, the transformative force of processes of displacement is probably the most taken for granted among all. But as the empirical puzzle presented by this research proposal demonstrates, the displacement of the formal institutional structure has led to fundamental political change in only one of the cases. For that reason, the growing need for identifying relevant mediating factors and ascertaining their role in accounting for the divergent political outcomes is more apparent than ever. As Thelen and Mahoney suggest, theory on gradual institutional change is still in the making; so there is much to learn from individual studies that are equipped to explore the role of possible intervening variables that can uncover the missing link between the two variables. My proposed study aims to do exactly that by limiting the theoretical focus on two of the processes of change identified by Mahoney and Thelen: displacement, which stands for the complete replacement of (formal) institutions with new ones; and conversion, which refers to a change in the enactment/enforcement of rules.

Displacement is a relevant process for change with regard to my empirical puzzle due to the fact that I focus on a universe of cases where the formal requirements of Decaf has been made, hence displacement with regard to formal institutions has already taken place. The relevance of conversion, on the other hand, stems from the observation that not all processes of displacement through the adoption of Decaf has lead to fundamental political change in civil-military relations in the EU's enlargement zone. I realise that Mahoney and Thelen define conversion strictly as a mode of institutional change where there is no change in formal rules, which is a different case than what is being presented here. However, I believe that it should be possible to conceptualise conversion as a process that can follow formal institutional change. In that sense, it is a legitimate question to ask whether or not conversion, defined as a change in the logic of implementation, has followed the process of displacement.

My argument regarding successful cases such as Poland is that the process of displacement has been coupled with an equally significant process of conversion, signified by a change in the actual enactment of the rule at the phase of implementation, which has possibly lead to the successful transformation of civil-military relations. In less successful cases such as Turkey, process of conversion has not followed displacement. So, even though Turkey has adopted the same formal model as Poland for reforming its security sector, displacement of the formal institutional framework was not combined with the equally crucial transformative process of conversion, thus failing to lead to a changed logic of enactment with regard to the political weight of the security sector in the country's political life. I further argue that informal institutions continue to guide the behaviour of rule enforcement bodies after displacement and their impact has been decisive for the emergence of a conversion process, which has ultimately lead to off-path change in Poland and on-path change in Turkey as defined earlier in this section.

I believe that the theory of gradual institutional change has a real potential for explaining institutional stability and change and for providing an answer to why we witness such divergent political outcomes under common stimuli for change. However, uncovering the role of mediating factors, such as informal institutions, are crucial for the further development of this theoretical framework and for

strengthening its explanatory value. My study proposes that informal institutions provide a fertile ground for research in order to comprehend more fully when formal institutional changes have a transformative effect on power relations that make up for a given political outcome. A natural follow-up from this argument is that the four different categories of institutional change may not be as mutually exclusive as Thelen and Mahoney suggest. In fact, depending on the results of this study, it might be possible to identify other forms of institutional change created through the interaction of different modes of change that are outlined by this theory. As stated earlier, in line with my empirical puzzle, my theoretical focus rests on the joint effects of the processes of displacement and conversion and whether their interaction can be linked to fundamental institutional change. Since the process of conversion relates to a change in the logic of implementation, and since formal institutional structures are not the only type of institutions that guide enforcers' actions, this study places key importance to the impact of informal institutions throughout this process. Together with formal ones, and through their interactions with them, informal institutions also influence political outcomes in the form of institutional change. Hence, their incorporation into the theory of gradual institutional change is crucial for uncovering important causal mechanisms that link displacement to fundamental institutional change.

Studying the effects of informal institutions on reform requires an extensive focus on ideational factors relating to the cognitive-normative structures of the polity, especially with regard to the way in which they can be linked to action. For that purpose, the study follows practice theory in contending that these ideational factors (informal institutions) are visibly enacted through bureaucratic and legal practices that are carried out by those who are responsible for the actual enforcement of a rule (Swidler, 2001). In other words, informal institutions, as ideational structures can be visibly traced by examining the practices of bodies that are responsible for enforcing the changed rules of the game. The focus on practices of reform is compatible with the theoretical framework on gradual institutional change, given that institutional change and stability depend not exclusively on written rules but on the ways in which these rules are instantiated in practice by the bureaucracy and the judiciary (Mahoney and Thelen). Due to its focus on practices that emerge at the phase of implementation, this study breaks away from statist approaches that view the reforming state as a 'coherent totality' with a unified rationale on how reforms ought to be implemented (Krasner, 1984) and embraces a more interpretive approach to institutional change, as it is understood, acted on and implemented by public bureaucracies and judicial law enforcers (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010).

Methodology

The study is designed as a comparative case study with a most similar systems research design (Przeworski & Teune, 1982). The two cases of Poland and Turkey have been selected due to having similar values on the independent variable (Europeanisation of security sector reform) and very different outcomes on the dependent variable (democratisation of civil-military relations) as well as their similarity in background conditions. The two countries applied for formal membership to the (present-day) EU around the same time (in 1987 and 1990) and both had a strong incentive to reform their security sector in order to become

members of the EU and/or NATO. In addition, their armed forces have enjoyed over a long period of time a privileged position in the political lives of both countries (Yaniszewski, 2002; Cizre, 2004). However, following the introduction of Decaf, Poland and Turkey experienced two very different outcomes with regard to fundamental/off-path change. Decaf method was successful in altering power relations in Poland where it made possible a new logic of action, which enabled the rest of the reform process to evolve in an off-path fashion. In Turkey the adaption of the same method left power dynamics intact (Cizre, 2004).

A common problem with MSS research design is that of overdetermination. This happens if the researcher discovers that another factor might be causing the outcome on the dependent variable during the course of her study (Collier, 1993). I aim to overcome this potential problem with the method of process tracing, an effective remedy for both omitted variables and spuriousness. Process tracing also allows for causal inference with a few cases (George and Bennett, 2004) and is conducive to theory building in historical scholarship (Hall, 2003). Should the causal chain reveal instances of multiple-causation during process tracing, it's possible to introduce a shadow case as a part of controlled comparison (Skocpol, 1979) or resort to configurational analyses such as qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin, 1987). Hungary, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia are potential cases should there be a need for such systematised comparison. However, these decisions depend on the initial results of the cross and within-case analyses from the two cases of Poland and Turkey and should be taken in the later stages of the study. During process tracing, critical junctures are of particular importance as points at which the impact of informal institutions on the emergence of the process of conversion can be observed.

Grounded on the theory of gradual institutional change, this study puts forward the hypothesis that Europeanisation of security sector reform in the EU's enlargement zone can lead to democratisation if formal institutional change (displacement) is coupled with a changed logic of implementation (conversion) and that informal institutions have a decisive impact on whether or not displacement is followed by conversion. Since the phase of implementation is dominated by actors other than the designers, specifically by members of the bureaucracy and the judiciary who are charged with the interpretation and enforcement of reform (Mahoney and Thelen 2010), the methodological focus is on the informal institutions that guide the behavior of these two groups in the two cases. I have provided definitions in the previous section as to what counts as an informal institution. The most challenging task regarding doing research about these types of institutions is that they are not explicitly stated in written form. However, they do point to practical regularities and guide the actions of rule enforcers along the 'logic of appropriateness' and can be visibly observed through the practices of law enforcers and civil servants (Swidler, 2001).

For the purpose of uncovering informal institutions that lead to the process of conversion, and ultimately towards fundamental political change, I examine the administrative and legal responses to Decaf as understood by civil servants and members of the judiciary in the two cases. In order to spot something as implicit as an informal institution, I would like to conduct in-depth interviews with civil servants in

relevant ministries in the two countries, such as the ministry of defense and the ministry of interior together with the members of the judiciary such as judges and prosecutors. With regard to the latter group, it's important to conduct separate interviews with high and low court judges since their practices for implementing Decaf (hence the relevant informal institutions) might be different from each other. During the interviews, I specifically look for an answer as to how they interpret the institutional changes around Decaf, whether this reform has altered their behavior and decisions, how they make sense of these changes, how the changes relate to their previous dealings under the old rules, and whether they think of these changes as a signal for adopting a new normative template to work with. In other words, to what extent do they transfer the new Decaf demands into the domestic administrative and legal structure? Through these interviews I aim to find out whether there are new unwritten rules that guide the actions of the members of these groups that can be linked to the process of conversion.

With regard to other forms of data, I will examine progress reports issued by the European Commission, various project reports completed about the two countries during their period of candidacy, national programmes of individual states as well as other EU-related documents that follow the reform programmes. Reports produced by the NATO will also be used as evidence in the case of Poland. During their candidacy to the EU, both Poland and Turkey have implemented EU-funded projects that aim at fostering implementation of Decaf at the practical level. Documents produced in the scope of these projects either by the EU delegation to the relevant country or by the ministries charged with the running of the relevant project in the candidate countries are also valuable sources of data. My within-case analyses will also make use of documents that reveal national histories and traditions such as archival documents and interview transcripts that are publicly available. These include minutes of meetings to parliamentary sessions, relevant parliamentary committee meetings, ministerial meetings as well as court hearings regarding civil-military relations.

Initially, I plan for a two-month stay in Turkey and a four-month stay in Poland. As far as access to data and relevant contacts is concerned, I expect the process to run much smoother in Turkey. First of all, I'm a native speaker of Turkish, which eliminates the language barrier. Secondly, my most recent job experience has been with the United Nations Development Programme in Ankara where I worked as a junior expert for an EU-funded project concerning civilian oversight of the security sector in Turkey. My main task has been to work with the Ministry of Interior of Turkey in evaluating the implementation of the project in three pilot cities. This has provided me both with significant insight as to the workings of informal institutions in the Turkish security sector reform context as well as with possible contacts at the ministry of interior and its affiliated bodies, governorates, the EU delegation and the newly founded ministry for EU affairs. With regard to data collection in Poland, EU and NATO-related documents and interviewing officials should not pose a language problem. However language barrier might be a potential challenge in case the course of my research would require me to dig deeper into national historical archives in order to spot informal institutions. For that reason I would like to enrol in the Polish language classes offered by the Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies (30 ECTS) at Copenhagen University. I also plan to be associated with an academic institution in Poland during my field trip in order to gain access to potential contacts

as well as to gain more insight into the political culture in Poland. Among the sources of funding that I plan to apply for in order to fund my stay in Poland are UNESCO's Keizo Obuchi Research Fellowships Programme and Polish government's grant for Turkish research students both of which gives its scholars a chance to work from within an academic institution in the host country.

Supervision Possibilities at DPS and Abroad

Preferred supervisors would be Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Ben Rosamond, who have expressed their interest for supervising this study should I be admitted to the programme. Their research profiles cover topics that are very much in line with my field of study, including Europeanisation, national implementation of EU's policies and ideational factors in political analysis. Throughout the course of my research, I also intend to collaborate closely with the Centre for European Politics and the Centre for Military Studies established at the Department of Political Science. I believe that my empirical focus and my theoretical positioning will fit well within the department and contribute to the twin goals of developing institutional theory and engaging in comparative political methodology.

For studying abroad, London School of Economics and Political Science, European Institute in Florence, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Northwestern University can offer excellent supervision opportunities for my research. During my studies at LSE, I had a chance to discuss this research proposal with some members of the faculty. M. Thatcher, S. Pamuk, R. Archer and K. Featherstone are some of the relevant names that I would be very fortunate to work with. James Mahoney at Northwestern and Kathleen Thelen at MIT would be excellent alternatives.

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