Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a ‘judge-rapporteur’ who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court’s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges’ political accountability can polarize already politicized debates. The President circumvents such dynamics by appointing a rapporteur whose government holds moderate political preferences. However, politics are relevant mainly when case law is not yet developed. The need for consistency also contributes to explain judges individual-level specialization, which arguably favors the construction of a coherent case law. The results speak to the lingering effect of judges’ renewable terms – despite secret voting – as well as the importance of courts’ internal organization for judicial independence.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Journal of European Public Policy |
Vol/bind | 27 |
Udgave nummer | 8 |
Sider (fra-til) | 1215-1235 |
ISSN | 1350-1763 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 23 jan. 2020 |
ID: 288790237