Citizen Attitudes on Politicians’ Pay: Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Citizen Attitudes on Politicians’ Pay : Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation. / Pedersen, Rasmus Tue; Pedersen, Lene Holm.

I: Political Studies, Bind 68, Nr. 2, 2019, s. 389-407.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Pedersen, RT & Pedersen, LH 2019, 'Citizen Attitudes on Politicians’ Pay: Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation', Political Studies, bind 68, nr. 2, s. 389-407. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719850073

APA

Pedersen, R. T., & Pedersen, L. H. (2019). Citizen Attitudes on Politicians’ Pay: Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation. Political Studies, 68(2), 389-407. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719850073

Vancouver

Pedersen RT, Pedersen LH. Citizen Attitudes on Politicians’ Pay: Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation. Political Studies. 2019;68(2):389-407. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719850073

Author

Pedersen, Rasmus Tue ; Pedersen, Lene Holm. / Citizen Attitudes on Politicians’ Pay : Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation. I: Political Studies. 2019 ; Bind 68, Nr. 2. s. 389-407.

Bibtex

@article{472e3ac55a324eb38ea61cc14f355579,
title = "Citizen Attitudes on Politicians{\textquoteright} Pay: Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation",
abstract = "Citizens are generally opposed to politicians receiving a high pay. We investigate the degree to which this aversion is moderated by citizens{\textquoteright} individual-level trust in politicians and whether institutional delegation can moderate the reactions to proposed changes in politicians{\textquoteright} pay. Using a survey experiment, we confirm that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding their pay. Distrust toward politicians seems to matter much more than general attitudes on income inequality when citizens form opinions on politicians{\textquoteright} pay. Furthermore, citizens{\textquoteright} aversion to high pay for politicians is affected by institutional delegation, but such delegation only lessen the opposition to pay raises modestly, leaving most citizens firmly against pay raises for politicians. Finally, while citizens{\textquoteright} trust in politicians matters greatly for their attitudes regarding politicians pay, proposed changes in politicians{\textquoteright} pay do not conversely affect citizen{\textquoteright}s perceptions of the politicians.",
author = "Pedersen, {Rasmus Tue} and Pedersen, {Lene Holm}",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1177/0032321719850073",
language = "English",
volume = "68",
pages = "389--407",
journal = "Political Studies",
issn = "0032-3217",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Citizen Attitudes on Politicians’ Pay

T2 - Trust Issues Are Not Solved by Delegation

AU - Pedersen, Rasmus Tue

AU - Pedersen, Lene Holm

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - Citizens are generally opposed to politicians receiving a high pay. We investigate the degree to which this aversion is moderated by citizens’ individual-level trust in politicians and whether institutional delegation can moderate the reactions to proposed changes in politicians’ pay. Using a survey experiment, we confirm that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding their pay. Distrust toward politicians seems to matter much more than general attitudes on income inequality when citizens form opinions on politicians’ pay. Furthermore, citizens’ aversion to high pay for politicians is affected by institutional delegation, but such delegation only lessen the opposition to pay raises modestly, leaving most citizens firmly against pay raises for politicians. Finally, while citizens’ trust in politicians matters greatly for their attitudes regarding politicians pay, proposed changes in politicians’ pay do not conversely affect citizen’s perceptions of the politicians.

AB - Citizens are generally opposed to politicians receiving a high pay. We investigate the degree to which this aversion is moderated by citizens’ individual-level trust in politicians and whether institutional delegation can moderate the reactions to proposed changes in politicians’ pay. Using a survey experiment, we confirm that trust in politicians is a key predictor of attitudes regarding their pay. Distrust toward politicians seems to matter much more than general attitudes on income inequality when citizens form opinions on politicians’ pay. Furthermore, citizens’ aversion to high pay for politicians is affected by institutional delegation, but such delegation only lessen the opposition to pay raises modestly, leaving most citizens firmly against pay raises for politicians. Finally, while citizens’ trust in politicians matters greatly for their attitudes regarding politicians pay, proposed changes in politicians’ pay do not conversely affect citizen’s perceptions of the politicians.

U2 - 10.1177/0032321719850073

DO - 10.1177/0032321719850073

M3 - Journal article

VL - 68

SP - 389

EP - 407

JO - Political Studies

JF - Political Studies

SN - 0032-3217

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 233794144