Lobbyists as Government Employees: Evidence from the Bureaucracy

Publikation: Working paperForskning

  • Benjamin C.K. Egerod
  • Joshua McCrain
A growing body of research examines the transition of government employees
into the private sector, commonly known as the revolving door. A common conclusion
in this work is that government employees cash in on their experience and, most
importantly, their connections to current officials. We focus on two under-studied
aspects of the revolving door: 1) the transition of lobbyists back into government
and 2) the value of connections between lobbyists and government agencies. Exploiting
the unexpected victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election
and the staggered timing of appointments into his administration, we find that firms
whose lobbyists went back through the revolving door saw 20-70% increase in revenue,
and the increase was larger in Democrat-leaning firms. Our results shed light
onto the political economy of the lobbying industry and suggest a need to further
study the interaction between lobbying firms and the federal bureaucracy
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Antal sider23
StatusUdgivet - 20 aug. 2018

ID: 201165826