The aim of this chapter is to investigate the strategic interaction in the bargaining over self-determination between the government of Indonesia and the separatist groups in East Timor, Aceh and Papua. The strategies and tactics deployed vary greatly not only between the different key actors but also over time. In addition, the outcomes of the bargaining process could hardly be any more different. In the case of East Timor, the campaign for independence succeeded. The former Portuguese colony was annexed by Indonesia in 1975, but a long clandestine struggle and the backing of the international community finally secured a referendum leading to independent statehood in 2002. In the other two cases, the government offered special autonomy in an attempt to diffuse secessionist demands. In the case of Aceh, the region was granted wide-ranging autonomy as the outcome of a negotiated and internationally mediated peace deal after an escalation of the dispute into full-scale civil war in the 2000s. In Papua, where the self-determination movement abandoned low-level insurgency in favour of nonviolent resistance, the government too granted special autonomy. In this case, however, the autonomy law can be considered a failure, not least because it failed to address the deep-rooted grievances and the implementation of the provision can be considered flawed at best. The dispute is far from being settled, as demonstrated by the recent upsurge of violence and political tensions.
What explains these different outcomes? I argue that it is one often neglected factor in particular that has a large impact on the bargaining process, both in terms of government’ and group’s strategy, and ultimately its outcome: the position of the international community. In cases where the government is open for (or has been coerced into) renegotiating the status quo, bargaining remains a strictly domestic matter. However, as soon as the government takes on an uncompromising stance and is willing to forcibly supress demands for greater self-determination or independence, access to and support of the international community becomes crucial. The government will try to restrict the group’s access to the international arena and undermine attempts at lending credibility to its self-determination claim. The group, on the other hand, will try to bypass the uncompromising government and make a normative appeal to the international community with the aim of raising both domestic and international support.
With this in mind, this chapter attempts to explain the variation in bargaining outcomes in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua, and illuminate the role of the international community in these particular cases. A specific focus is given to the use of and shift in strategies of tactics of the key actors involved. The ultimate goal of the comparative analysis is to provide an empirical example of self-determination disputes that take place on a strategic playing field linking the domestic and international level and further illustrate the crucial role of the international community in such disputes. The main takeaway point from the comparison is that it is the position of the international community that not only ultimately determines the outcome of self-determination disputes, but also influences the strategies and tactics employed by key actors – particularly in cases where the government is uncompromising. As will be demonstrated in the following section, all three of the separatist groups used international norms surrounding democracy and human rights that are explicitly linked to self-determination to promote their demands and seek legitimacy and support in both the domestic as well as the international sphere precisely because of the uncompromising position of the government. Despite trying to concede as little as possible, the Indonesian government is receptive to international pressure when reaching a certain tipping point, thus indicating a need for a better understanding of the impact of international regimes on self-determination disputes.