Third-Party Incentive Strategies and Conflict Management in Africa

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  • emmanuel_e

    Forlagets udgivne version, 243 KB, PDF-dokument

  • Nikolas G. Emmanuel
Dr. Nikolas Emmanuel's examines the use of an incentives approach in managing intrastate conflict in Africa because in many cases, risks and costs make applications of hard power alone unfeasible. Furthermore, simply ignoring episodes of civil conflict in the hope that they will "burn themselves out"� does not appear to be a viable alternative. That said, both noncoercive and coercive incentive strategies exist and have been deployed by third parties in a variety of conflict situations. Such incentives seek to manage conflict by encouraging political bargaining. The clear intention of this approach is to shift the behavior of targeted actors away from violence and towards more peaceful interaction. Indeed, such incentives offer a good deal of underexplored opportunities to help manage discord. This research has two primary objectives. First, it furthers the discussion of how external third parties can help manage conflicts. Second, it offers a typology of the available incentive strategies, classifying them along noncoercive and coercive lines. Thus, the article outlines the possibilities offered by an incentives approach, focusing on examples drawn from recent African cases.
TidsskriftAir and Space Power Journal
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)14-30
Antal sider16
StatusUdgivet - mar. 2016

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