Ph.D. project description –

When Bad Policies are Good Politics
- how politicians use public resources for personal gains

4. A short summary of the proposed research project

Clientelism exists in all polities. The form it takes, its extent, and its political functions vary enormously, however, across time and place. Nicholas van de Walle (2007, p.50)

The allocation of resources in society is at the heart of politics (Lasswell 1936, Easton 1965). In Africa, a considerable part of such allocation happens through clientelism (see Wantchekon 2003, Hicken and Simmons 2008, Kramon and Posner 2016), a phenomenon where politicians seek to mobilize support through personal exchanges rather than broader programmatic appeals and public goods provision (Grzymala-Busse 2008, Cruz and Keefer 2015). In other words, politicians pursue narrow self-interests through public spending and regulatory provisions often on behalf of long-term development (Stokes 2011).

However, little is known about how institutions determine the clientelistic strategies and instruments pursued by politicians; a lack that is partly explained by limited data availability. To remedy this, my PhD project seeks to scrutinize the incentives and strategies chosen by African politicians, hoping to advance our understanding of why we observe different materializations of clientelism across time and space. Specifically, I seek to explore three issues: firstly, how a reduction in fiscal resources affects how much politicians offer for support; secondly, whether political discontent determines who politicians target with benefits; and finally, why politicians use different instruments of targeted redistribution.

Methodologically, I apply Geographical Information Systems (GIS, see below). Due to the covered nature of clientelism, it has previously been nearly impossible to study the phenomenon in a cross-country, large-N setting (Franck and Rainer 2012, Cruz and Keefer 2015). To tackle such challenge, I propose a Ph.D. project seeking to convincingly argue that many phenomena relevant to clientelism are geographically defined. In this sense, ethnic groups tend to reside geographically concentrated (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011, Hodler and Raschky 2014), public investments often favour groups within geographical proximity (Fearon 1999), and due to climate requirements, crop production (and the resulting political targeting through taxes or tariffs) also has a spatial element. Realizing this I am able to provide new, innovative ways to generate precise measures of clientelism in Africa.

5. Purpose of the research project
During Mobutu Sese-Seko’s presidency (ex-Zaire, 1965-1997) he accumulated an estimated $5 billion in personal wealth by diverting Zairean government funds to himself. Funds, with which he transformed his birth town, Gbadolite, a small town in remote North-Eastern Zaire, into an extravagant metropole and built an airport capable of handling supersonic concords (Hodler and Raschky 2014). An example not dissimilar to that of Ivorian president Felix Houphouët-Boigny, who turned his hometown into the national capital (Kasara 2007). However, questions arise as to why the likes of Sese-Seko and Houphouët-Boigny made use of large-scale public investments to favour co-ethnics, when Kenyan presidents systematically do so through educational policies (Kramon and Posner 2016)?

The purpose of my PhD dissertation is twofold. Theoretically, I seek to fill the gaps in our understanding of exactly how institutional and political factors facilitate or impede the extent to which clientelism is pursued and, as importantly, how it is pursued. Though scholars have touched upon different clientelistic strategies previously (Grzymala-Busse 2008, Green 2011), theoretical explanations of why certain strategies are pursued as well as what instruments are chosen, are lacking. Methodologically, I will apply GIS in order to develop an unprecedented cross-country dataset on clientelism in Africa. This allows me to study empirically the use of redistributive instruments in a so far unparalleled way.

Hence, my PhD dissertation seeks to study how the incentives of politicians risk being misaligned with the long-term interest of the countries they lead, how political institutions potentially affect such behaviour, and finally how politicians try to cover up such actions.

6. Background - determinants of clientelistic behaviour

The literature has convincingly argued that clientelism is widespread throughout Africa. Thus, scholars have pointed to ethnic-favouritism in elementary schooling in Congo-Brazzaville (Franck and Rainer 2012), and Kenya (Kramon and Posner 2016). Across forty developing countries, Hodler and Raschky (2014) find that night light luminosity (a proxy for economic prosperity) is significantly higher in areas affiliated with a country’s political leader - a conclusion in accordance with the widely held belief that leaders in power redistribute for personal gains (Hicken and Simmons 2008, Golden and Min 2013, for the opposite view see Kasara 2007, Lindberg and Morrison 2008). Finally, the phenomenon seems to have survived the waves of democratization (Van de Walle 2009).

Following such realization, it seems that the maxim ‘good policies may be bad politics and bad policies may be good politics’ is truly relevant (Easterly and Levine 1997, Schuster 2016). However, when explaining why some countries are more prone to clientelism than others, results become less convincing. Historically, theories have implicitly assumed that clientelism was a problem ‘of the poor’. It was expected that as countries developed, clientelism would gradually wane (Scott 1969). However, confronted with development, it turns out clientelism is often adapted to new political contexts, possibly by changing strategies and instruments (Grzymala-Busse 2008, Carozzi and Repetto 2016).

What determines whom politicians target?
Realizing the enduring nature of clientelism, theorizing began on why it persists. Thus, building on the classical work of Riker (1962), Fearon (1999) argues that politicians seek to form a minimal winning coalition. In this way, clientelism becomes a politics of exclusion and it only persists, if people cannot easily self-select into such coalition. This way, observable characteristics, like some ethnic traits, become exclusionary criteria (see also Caselli and Coleman 2006, i Miquel 2007). Stokes (2005) models the exchange as a coordination game between the clientele and the politician. Either actor has an incentive to deviate when benefits from the mutual exchange have been extracted. Thus, Stokes argues that the repeated game aspect, as well as the mutual monitoring become crucial when explaining the persistence of clientelism.

This theorizing has intensified the focus on who is targeted by clientelistic policies - a subfield which makes up a clear majority of studies trying to understand clientelistic strategies. In this way, the studies of clientelism touch upon central questions in the field of redistributive politics more generally (Cox and McCubbins 1986, Dahlberg and Johansson 2002). One expectation developed in Dixit and Londregan (1996) is that segments who are less costly will be targeted. Studying clientelism specifically, qualitative evidence suggests that politicians target poor voters as they are more cheaply bought (Calvo and Murillo 2004). However, due to scarce resources, not even all of the poor people receive benefits. In this respect, formal theories and empirical results cannot seem to agree whether loyal or critical voters is the optimal, cost-efficient strategy to pursue (Stokes 2005, 2011, Nichter 2008, Golden and Min 2013).

Institutions as facilitator and impediment to clientelism

Such disagreement ought to be put to empirical testing, but data availability has limited valid generalizations (Hicken 2011). Consequently, we know only little about how institutional factors affect incentives of either the politician or the clients when engaging in the mutual exchange. Some studies, however, have been successful in depicting the importance of context. Hence, Hicken and Simmons (2008) find that personal vote systems, and the incentive for particularistic policies resulting hereof, reduce the effect of education spending on illiteracy. Keefer and Khemani (2009) conclude that politicians ‘pass on pork’ (i.e. non-programmatic benefits) when voters are more attached to parties as party attachment reduces the incentive to cultivate personal votes. Finally, Hodler & Rashky (2014) find that weak political institutions seem to facilitate patronage, whereas educational attainment impedes it. However, though being important contributions, such studies do not address how institutions might affect clientelism by making politicians substitute towards other redistributive instruments. Instead, the studies are solely directed at how political institutions impede or facilitate the extent of clientelism.

What redistributive instrument is used and why?

In his seminal piece, Scott (1969) argues that legislation is not a ‘suitable vehicle for the expression of particularistic interests’ whereas the enforcement stage is almost exclusively particularistic. Reviewing the literature, such expectation receives some empirical support. Thus, whereas the favouritism in implementation of educational policies (Hicken and Simmons 2008, Kramon and Posner 2016) and health policies (Franck and Rainer 2012), as well as public investment (Keefer and Khemani 2009) have all been empirically supported in Africa, the existence of clientelistic tax laws was not (i Miquel 2007, Kasara 2007). Realizing this, it seems studies should be aware of which strategy and redistributive tool is in fact being used, and why. Studying four types of redistributive policies, Kramon and Posner (2013) find that the evidence for ethnic favouritism varies with the instrument one studies. Thus, whereas co-ethnics of the president are more likely to
One of the few pieces exploring what institutional factors determine the choice of instruments of redistribution is the theoretical piece presented in Green (2011). Green argues that as competition increases the probability of exit from office, it increases the discount rate of politicians. Consequently, politicians make use of more visible instruments of redistribution, for supporters to know exactly who provided the benefits. However, the direction of causality is not clear cut. Thus, Grzymala-Busse (2008) argues that redistribution itself determines the level of competition. In addition, the work needs to be put to empirical testing. Below, I present an unprecedented empirical approach to do just that.

It is worth noting that much of the work on clientelism is either purely theoretical (Caselli and Coleman 2006, i Miquel 2007) or empirically limited, often in the form of field experiments (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009). At the most aggregate, studies have analysed clientelism within single countries (Kramon and Posner 2016). In the next section I broaden the design presented in Hodler & Rascky (2014), and propose a Ph.D. project able to study clientelism and instruments across countries. In this way, I am able to explore how politicians design clientelistic policies across different institutional settings, something which has so far not been done.

7. Project description

The following section is divided in two, and outlines my theoretical approach as well as my empirical research designs.

7.1. Theoretical approach

Before describing each proposed paper in depth, I will briefly outline the theoretical framework that they all share. Traditionally, clientelism is perceived as a situation with two parties; a politician motivated by the desire to retain office, and the ‘clientele’ (i.e. a societal actor whose support is demanded by the politician) (Stokes 2005, 2011, Nichter 2008). The politician and the clientele engage in a mutual exchange of crucial goods - political support for private benefits (Keefer 2007). The clientele has inherent preferences about politicians. Therefore, their support is not necessarily free of cost.

However, I broaden the perspective by including a third party: the general society. The rest of society is excluded from the exchange, and bears the cost of the potentially inefficient distribution of society’s wealth. The inclusion of the third party alters the dynamic of the exchange between the politician and the clientele. Redistribution towards the clientele now entails a trade-off, as it might counter-mobilize the general society eventually bearing the cost. Hence, the addition of the general society opens up to theorizing on how politicians optimize the redistribution towards the clientele without upsetting non-receivers.

In this respect, I argue that politicians will adapt their behaviour to the institutional surroundings within which they are situated and act strategically when designing clientelistic policies by
substituting towards the optimal, cost-efficient instruments and targets (Green 2011, Grzymala-Busse 2008). This is supported by the assumption that politicians receive no utility from the support of the clientele in and of itself (e.g. pride) (Posner 2005). Instead, an instrumentalist view suggests that clientelistic policies are in fact costly to the politician, as the resources being distributed to the clientele could have been consumed by the politician.

The focus on the instruments of redistribution available to politicians is not only important theoretically. Oftentimes, clientelism is proxied by a single instrument, without any elaborate discussion of the particular consequences of such operationalization (Franck and Rainer 2012, Hodler and Raschky 2014, Kramon and Posner 2013). Consequently, inferences from single proxies to clientelism more generally risk being systematically flawed, due to what eventually becomes a problem of measurement validity. That is, important aspects of clientelism are systematically, and unknowingly, excluded from the measure, as politicians substitute towards other strategies under given circumstances.

To investigate these claims, I propose three theoretical issues expected to produce the papers eventually making up my Ph.D. dissertation. The issues all relate to how institutions and political contexts influence the strategies of clientelistic politicians in Africa, and are presented below:

1) **Constraints on clientelistic behaviour**
   This study investigates how clientelistic behaviour is constrained by reduced fiscal resources. By applying GIS I can generate a proxy of ethnic group GDP using night light luminosity, which can be correlated with having a co-ethnic in power or not. Also, I can explore how economic crisis mediates the correlation. The study could be published in *Comparative Politics*.

2) **Targeting who?**
   Analysing the behaviour on social media, I can create a measure of political discontent with the ruling elite at very local levels. In this way, I can study whether clientelistic politicians systematically direct public resources in the direction of the mildly critical areas. As such use of social media data has not been done before, the generation and validation of the measure could be published in *Political Science Research and Methods*. The substantial piece could be published in *Comparative Political Studies*.

3) **A stealth policy of redistribution**
   This study explores whether reduced electoral competition makes politicians substitute away from visible to covered instruments of redistribution. It could be published in *Public Choice*.

**7.2. Research question and empirical designs**

The following section outlines my general methodological approach. Subsequently, a detailed description of each study is conducted. All studies are guided by separate research questions, addressed by different data sources, but all my designs are rooted in a geographical dimension.

The intuition is that many aspects relevant to clientelism have a spatial dimension. In this way, different types of data can be joined in new and innovative ways, as they will tend to relate to each other in one crucial way: their geographical location. Hence, clients in political systems, the level of government critique on social media, public procurement contracts, and particular tariffs on crops have no obvious way to be combined into one analysis. However, clients have a place of residence (e.g. ethnic settlements), and such place of residence is often reported on social media platforms. Companies winning public procurement contracts have an address, and due to climate requirements,
crops are grown in certain areas and not others. Realizing this, I can detect whether an ethnic group’s local, economic conditions change when a co-ethnic politician is in power or how an ethnic group’s particular crop is being targeted by politicians through import tariffs or taxes. In addition, I can explore whether public procurement contracts, resulting in local jobs, tend to be directed to mildly critical areas where support is easily bought. The logic of my empirical approach is illustrated in Figure 1.

The collection of this kind of data demands a certain level of programming skills, including scraping Google maps for company addresses. My experience with programming, including scraping the web or social media, comes partly from attending the courses ‘Social Data Science’ (KU), ‘Advanced Quantitative methods in Political Science’ (KU) and ‘Special Topics in Quantitative Analysis’ (LSE). Moreover, as a project scientist for Uber Tech, I have had to make use of web scraping and programming more generally. Finally, I applied GIS software in my MSc thesis.

**Figure 1**: Example of Map Overlaying (Cameroon)

*Rectangles represent 50km x 50km grid cells. Shaded areas represent ethnic settlements. By aggregating information from each grid cell, (or other geo-coded data), ethnic-indicators can be created.*

7.2.1. Study 1: Constraints on Clientelistic Behaviour

My first study explores the question: how do external forces shape the behaviour of clientelistic politicians? Specifically, I seek to estimate the impeding effect of economic crisis on the extent to which politicians can engage in clientelistic exchanges. Economic crisis dramatically reduces the fiscal resources available to pursue clientelistic policies. For the theoretical assumptions to be supported empirically, I expect such substantial, political change to affect the behaviour of the politician. Specifically, I will investigate whether the correlation between having a co-ethnic politician in the executive and the local economic development for the particular ethnic group is mediated by the national economic situation, such that ethnic groups with a co-ethnic in power in a country experiencing economic crisis will receive fewer benefits, than if there had been no economic downturn.

**Design**: Through map overlaying I am able to detect changes in the GDP for specific ethnic groups, proxied as night light luminosity. Moreover, data can be collected on politicians in important executive functions, as well as their ethnic affiliation. This way, it can be analysed whether
economic crisis reduces the benefits distributed towards ethnic groups affiliated with the country’s leadership. Secondly, the design allows for an exploration of whether economic crisis makes politicians substitute towards less fiscally contingent instruments.

A feasible identification strategy for a subset of democracies facing very close elections can be a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Causal identification is necessary, as the probability of a politician reaching office is higher, if s/he is affiliated with a prosperous ethnic group. RDD can be argued to introduce exogenous variation in the independent variable (office holding) by treating the outcome of close call elections as if random. Hence, one can argue that there is no systematic difference between politicians who barely made it into office and politicians who were very close but failed. This causal design furthermore offers an alternative to field experiments as it provides an identification strategy across countries (for the use of field experiments, see Vicente and Wantchekon 2009).

Data: GIS data on night light luminosity are available in PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen, et al. 2012). Ethnic settlements are defined in the geo-EPR dataset (Wucherpfennig, et al. 2011). Data on candidates and electoral percentages is available from the African Elections Database ¹. Furthermore, data on ethnic affiliation has previously been gathered successfully (Fearon, et al. 2007, Kasara 2007).

7.2.2. Study 2: Targeting Who?

My second study asks the question: who is targeted by clientelistic politicians? If the behaviour of politicians is in fact strategic; low-income, mildly critical groups are expected to be addressed, as it provides the politician with ‘most bang for the buck’ (see Keefer and Khemani 2009 for a study of India). Hence, I expect politicians to redistribute resources to mildly critical areas in order to gain support. This is expected, as these areas will be cheaper to buy off than very critical areas. However, contrary to very positive areas, support cannot be expected without redistribution. I expect that politicians will seek to cover up such redistribution. As critique of the government in itself cannot justify redistribution, it would be perceived as the government solely pursuing self-interest in the eyes of the general society. For such argument to hold, I expect politicians to redistribute through local public investments, proxied as the location of any company winning a public procurement contract. Contrarily, I use aid projects as a form of placebo test. Hence, the expectation is that such instrument is not used due to its uncovered nature, though politically targeted aid is doable (Briggs 2014). Public procurement contracts have not previously been explored in terms of clientelism.

This design opens up for new insights in at least two ways. Firstly, the core vs. swing dynamic has so far not been studied across time and space (Golden and Min 2013). Secondly, the design presented allows for an analysis across regime types. Thus, it becomes possible to shed light on similar ‘swing-support’ dynamics within authoritarian regimes. (For innovative theorizing on distribution of goods across regimes, see Min 2015).

Design: I propose the use of Facebook data to measure the local attitude towards the ruling elite. Facebook data provides an improvement to other sources of political attitudes. Firstly, it provides extensive information across space and time. Thus, whereas the spatial and temporal coverage of

¹ http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html
Afrobarometer or Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) is inadequate, Facebook data allows me to generate local indicators with full coverage across years, months or even weeks. Extensive data coverage on political (dis)satisfaction is crucial when seeking to explore whether public resources seems to be systematically directed towards mildly critical areas (see Nichter 2008). In addition, Facebook facilitates coordination and is thus argued to be a more honest indicator of true preferences than surveys answers, which risk being biased, for example due to fear of repercussions. The approach is possible as social media has become an integral part of life for a large (an increasingly growing) part of Africans, and the signal coverage has expanded markedly (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013). However, I will be aware of possible risks due to self-selection into the use of social media. Approximately 12 pct. of Africans use Facebook.\footnote{http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm}

The simplest measure would be a ratio of negative versus positive endorsements in the form of liking either pre-identified government or anti-government pages. As Facebook data furthermore contains geographical information (e.g. reported village or city of residence), I can study the ruling elite’s responsiveness to the public opinion for disaggregated geographical areas.

Data: As the amount of Facebook data publicly available is capped, I will seek to contact Facebook directly (for examples of this, see Aral and Walker 2012, Bond and Messing 2015). If this, against my expectation, turns out not to be possible, I will draw upon the information publicly available\footnote{Accessed through the Facebook’s official application programming interface (API). For DHS see http://spatialdata.dhsprogram.com/home/} together with the geo-coded DHS dataset which offers information on general satisfaction. Geo-coded data on World Bank aid projects are available for more than 60,000 locations (totalling commitments of nearly $605bn) and can be retrieved on the Aiddata webpage\footnote{http://aiddata.org/subnational-geospatial-research-datasets}. The World Bank Group’s database on public procurement contracts\footnote{https://finances.worldbank.org/Procurement/Major-Contract-Awards/kdui-wcs3/data.} in Africa contains just short of 38,000 contracts (including data on country, contract amount, supplier, as well as date of signature) in the period 2004-2016. The total worth of contracts is more than $38bn. Company locations will be scraped from Google maps.

7.2.3. Study 3: A ‘Stealth’ Policy of Redistribution

My third study asks: \textit{why do politicians use one clientelistic instrument over another?} Politicians seek support through optimal cost-efficient strategies. Redistributive policies will inevitably make some groups worse off, resulting in risks of mobilizing opponents. Realizing this, the politician will choose visible instruments of redistribution primarily in cases where visibility has advantages of its own, e.g. increasing the general perception of a politician as a high performing politician ‘getting things done’. Following this, I expect politicians in competitive elections with a free press to redistribute through visible instruments to a higher extent than politicians faced with less competitive elections, and a low press freedom. Furthermore, the benefits have to be observable and easily traceable back to the politician (Green 2011). However, as the degree of competitive elections decrease and the free press becomes limited, the politician is expected to substitute towards instruments providing targeted private goods to elites, removed from public attention (Grzymala-Busse 2008).
Visible instruments of redistribution are proxied as tax policy, aid, social policies and health policies, whereas non-transparent instruments are studied as tariffs on crops and public procurement contracts. As clientelism is argued to be widespread across regime types, this study may provide crucial insights into how the previous estimates of clientelism in authoritarian regimes have been biased downwards due to their systematic use of ‘covered’ instruments.

**Design:** Data is partly developed in the two previous papers. In addition, many types of production are geographically confined (e.g. crop production). Therefore, I am able to pair ethnic groups with the types of goods produced in their area (see Kasara 2007). Realizing this, ethnic groups can be linked to specific import tariffs on crops. Hence, making use of the fact that trade policy is in fact able to non-transparently redistribute wealth domestically (Rogowski 1989, Grossman and Helpman 1996, Mansfield, et al. 2007), I can analyse whether a substitution towards trade policy or public procurement contracts occurs when the politician wishes to cover up the redistribution. To my knowledge, this is the first time trade policy has been studied as an instrument of clientelism. Furthermore, trade policy is unique in the fact that any limitation of free trade is translated directly into deadweight losses (Golden and Min 2013).

The results risk being biased by the fact that crops might not be distributed randomly across ethnic groups. At least two such scenarios are possible. Assuming that crop production is constant over time, ethnic groups may historically have self-selected into areas with a certain crop. Contrarily, if crops grown are not constant, strong ethnic groups might be more likely to subsidize production towards more protected crops, whereas poor ethnic groups are stuck with only one choice of production. I hope to develop a design able to address such endogeneity.

**Data:** WTO provides import tariffs on distinct crops (e.g. oilseeds, fats, and oil; cereals and preparations; sugars and confectionery; fruits, vegetables, plants) in a period ranging from 1980-2014. To create an extensive dataset, I make use of the mapping of the global distribution of crops developed in Monfreda, et al. (2008). Consequently, I can estimate the importance of different crops for each ethnic group by applying map-overlaying software. The data contains information on 11 overall crop types (e.g. oil crop; sugar crop; fruit and vegetable; cereal) and 175 sub-categories. The data is available for 10km x 10km areas.

8. Preliminary study plan and organization

All of the data except the extract from Facebook is readily available, which leaves time for data handling and analysis. As I have been hired by prof. Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and prof. Marlene Wind to assist them in editing the book ‘Europa I Forandring’, I hope this can make up for some of my work responsibility for the Department. In addition, I hope to be able to teach ‘Sammenlignende Statskundskab’. If possible, I furthermore wish to offer my own course ‘Research Designs and Programming in Political Science’ as I believe that a basic knowledge of computing opens up a multitude of data sources to political science students. Next to my responsibilities at the Department, I seek to attend two unique methodology courses offered at the university of Essex; focusing on analysing spatial data (e.g. GIS) and social media data. Secondly, a stay at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) would allow me to engage with top scholars within clientelism, (e.g. Evan Lieberman).

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## 8.1 Timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Semester</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2017 | Spring   | 1) Acquire/analyse data 1st study  
2) Write draft for 1st study  
3) Feb-March: finish editing the book ‘Europa I Forandring’  
4) Contact Facebook concerning data access (2nd paper)  
5) PhD courses  
6) **Summer**: two summer school courses (see budget) |
|      | Autumn   | 1) Finish 1st study  
2) Prepare data for 2nd study  
3) Teach ‘Sammenlignende Statskundskab’ |
| 2018 | Spring   | 1) Analyse data and write draft for 2nd paper  
2) Prepare data for analysis (3rd paper) |
|      | Autumn   | 1) Visiting scholar at Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
a. Finish 2nd study  
b. Present results (1st/2nd study) and ideas for 3rd study to relevant scholars at MIT  
c. Apply for registration of course, prepare curriculum/handouts/slides (own course) |
2) Analyse and write draft for 3rd study |
|      | Autumn   | 1) Finish 3rd study  
2) Write up dissertation |

## 8.2 Relation to the Department more broadly

The project relates to the research being done at the Department in several ways. The broader theoretical approach of analysing the institutional outcomes in developing countries as well as elite struggles is closely associated with associate professor Jacob Gerner Hariri’s work. Jacob is currently doing a project with associate professor Mogens Kamp Justesen (Copenhagen Business School) on vote buying and clientelism in South Africa. Postdoc Bertel Teilfeldt Hansen’s work on ethnic conflict as a consequence of elections provides me with very interesting insights parallel to my own work. Associate professor Daniel Bochsler’s work also touches upon ethnic politics, particularly power-sharing institutions. Ph.D. student Lasse Aaskoven studies how incumbents are responsive to the electorate in order to secure electoral support, often through public resource spending. Currently, Lasse and I work on a joint project. We seek to estimate the extent to which the African political elites accumulate rents, by measuring the difference in light emission between their place of residence and the country in general. The GovLis project also studies government responsiveness in order to secure re-election, though they do it for Western democracies. In addition, whereas GovLis ask when governments are responsive, I ask to whom and how. Ph.D. student Benjamin Carl Krag Egerod studies how interest organizations to some extent capture political systems, also for developed countries. On suggestion of our bachelor supervisor, associate professor Asmus Leth Olsen, Benjamin and I are to submit a paper on the political influence of micro-economic actors (initially our BSc thesis) to the European Union Politics journal. Moreover, there is the quantitative network, which I seek to actively take part in.
Finally, the cross-departmental Centre for Social Data Science (SODAS) will be able to provide consultation. Hence, in their project ‘Mass Politics and Social Media’ they estimate attitudes towards the political system using behaviour on social media.

9. Estimated budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure item</th>
<th>Expenditure (Danish kroner)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research stay at a university in the US (Travel expenses)</td>
<td>7,000 DKR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer school, University of Essex (course: ‘Exploration and analysis of Social Media Data’)</td>
<td>12,000 DKR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer school, University of Essex (course: ‘Spatial Data Analysis and Geo-computation for Decision Making’)</td>
<td>12,000 DKR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference attendance I</td>
<td>6,500 DKR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference attendance II</td>
<td>6,500 DKR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,000-44,000 DKR.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 For course overview, see http://essexsummerschool.com/summer-school-facts/courses/complete-2016-course-list/2h-exploration-and-analysis-of-social-media-data/

8 For course overview, see http://essexsummerschool.com/summer-school-facts/courses/complete-2016-course-list/2n-spatial-data-analysis-and-geocomputation-for-decision-making/
10. References


