PhD Project Proposal

Science, Expertise, and the Security Strategies of Rising Powers

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PhD Proposal: Science, Expertise, and the Security Strategies of Rising Powers

Introduction

Puzzle and disposition
How do rising powers mobilize intellectual resources in their security strategies? What is the role of knowledge production for rising non-Western powers? What kinds of knowledge do they demand and from what agencies? This PhD proposal examines the role of security expertise in the formulation of national security strategies in Brazil, China, and India in the post-Cold War period. My main theoretical puzzle is whether the seemingly similar macro- and geopolitical environment of rising powers generates specific dynamics of intellectual innovation. It theorizes the knowledge/power nexus in a practical and micro-sociological way, with particular theoretical attention to linkages between different types of knowledge producing agencies and the formulation of national security strategies. In my former research, I have focused on the academic production of security knowledge in China (Kristensen and Nielsen 2010) but I have since realized the importance of theorizing the continuum from the disciplinary and theoretical knowledge forms of academia through the more practical and applied modalities of think tanks to policymaking, because various agencies tend to be involved in fashioning of security strategies. Therefore, this PhD proposal introduces to International Relations a theoretical framework based on the sociology of knowledge that draws particular attention to micro-level networks and inter-personal linkages, the organizational relations between policymakers, think tanks, and universities as well as macro-political factors. The theoretical argument pursued is that sociological and social network theories of knowledge production must be incorporated, in addition to semiotic and materialist perspectives, in order to understand the national security strategies of rising powers.

The different levels of the model are operationalized in a comparative case study design that triangulates quantitative and qualitative methods. At the micro-level, it applies ethnomet hodological interview methods and network analytical methods inspired by actor-network-theory. Structural features are studied using statistical methods from social network analysis. My academic contribution—in studying rising power strategies from the perspective of knowledge production—is aimed at the growing International Relations literature on security practitioners, epistemic communities, and the epistemic power of knowledge producing agencies and technocratic elites on security strategies. My main motivation, however, is to acquire more knowledge about non-Western perspectives on international relations. How new and diverse players in world politics understand security is crucial to our understanding of the security policy and behavior of these future powers and our navigation in a post-Western world. The comparative insights into Brazil, China and India’s security policy produced by this research proposal are thus relevant to both scholars and policymakers who wish to understand security in a world where the production truths and knowledge is no longer a privilege of the West.

Background
World politics is entering a post-Western stage. The political and economic rise of third world countries and the relative decline of Western great powers is transforming world politics from Western-centered to multi-centered. A key feature of this change is the geopolitical rise of non-Western countries, sometimes referred to as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China). These emerging powers are showing aspirations toward greater activism and leverage on the global stage, but their rise is shrouded in uncertainty because former third world countries such as China, India and Brazil bring different cultures, political systems, and histories of colonialism onto the stage. For this reason, and because Russia is arguably not a ‘rising’ power, I have selected the three cases of Brazil, India, and China. A key security dilemma for these rising non-Western, and in some cases non-democratic, powers is how to pave the road the great power status. Knowledge production is a crucial—but often overlooked—part of the capacity building to fulfill such aspirations, yet it tends to be pooled in the furry concept of ‘soft power’ strategies (Nye 2004; and for example the literature on China’s soft power Bell 2009; Glaser and Murphy 2009; Kurlantzick 2007; McGiffert 2009; Mingjiang 2008; Sheng 2010). Growing ambitions in Brasilia, Delhi, and Beijing has led to a high demand for foreign policy advice, and yet there is little
research about the knowledge base of foreign policy making in these newly emerging powers. If the scientific discipline International Relations, and its sub-discipline security studies in particular, is indeed “an American social science” (Hoffmann 1977; Wæver 1998; Smith 2000) serving American and Western interests where does that leave rising non-American and non-Western powers? Although some have argued that “there is no non-Western International Relations theory” (Acharya and Buzan 2007, 2010), there is evidence that some rising powers have made an effort to develop their own visions of the world and corresponding IR theories or what could be called ‘practice theories’. For example, Chinese IR scholars have discussed how to construct a particularly Chinese School of International Relations, which in some ways resonates with the government’s call for a ‘Harmonious World’ and ‘Peaceful Rise’ (see Hu 2005). I have previously studied the case of China with a particular focus on the relationship between rising power and academic knowledge production (Kristensen and Nielsen 2010), and the section below focuses primarily on findings related to the Chinese case, how these demand further research, and why a comparative setup is necessary to do so. It also serves as an illustration of the subject matter, or dependent variable, of the thesis: the general security orientation known as ‘grand strategy’ (e.g. P. Kennedy 1992; Posen and A. L. Ross 1996) or ‘strategic culture’ (e.g. C. Gray 1981; Johnston 1995; Klein 1986) and not, that is, a specific technological policy area like nuclear strategy. Unlike the literature on grand strategy and strategic culture, which has been criticized for its lack of a framework for empirical analysis and its reified notion of culture (Neumann 2005), I suggest a focus on the practices of different security agencies, think tanks, policymakers, academic experts, and how they employ different security rationalities in the formation of grand strategy of a rising power.

Peaceful Rise – science and expertise in the grand strategy of a rising power

During the past decade, Chinese policymakers have launched several new strategic concepts such as Peaceful Rise and the Confucian-inspired Harmonious World in opposition to Western discourses on a ‘China threat’. Various actors from the broader Chinese security network have been involved in the formulation of new ideas on security. Various experts from universities and think tanks have been directly involved in the fashioning of China’s new strategic concepts. Chinese military and intelligence academics are recovering ancient Chinese strategic classics and debate how to put them into practice (Scobell 2002). The Chinese academic IR community is allocating substantial attention and resources to construct a particularly Chinese school, often with the explicit intention of supporting the hypothesis of China’s peaceful rise (Qin 2007; Ren 2008; Yan 2008; Yiwei Wang 2007, 2009). As two observers note, Peaceful Rise “provides an example of how new foreign policy ideas and strategies can come from outside the formal, central government bureaucracy, and underscores the growing relevance of think-tank analysts and university-based scholars.” (Glaser and Medeiros 2007, 291). It may not be surprising that rising powers with growing international interests and ambitions demand more instrumental, policy-relevant, and area-specific knowledge forms from security experts at think tanks. More puzzling, however, is the demand for theoretical and normative visions of world order for their strategy formulation—as exemplified by China’s Peaceful Rise, Scientific Development and Harmonious World strategies.

1 Some of the most famous examples are Wang Huning who served as dean at Fudan University and now is director of the Policy Research Office of the Party Central Committee, and considered one president Hu Jintao’s closest advisors and one of the architects of China’s soft power strategy. Zheng Bijan from the Central Party School, a government think tank, who was the original architect behind the concept ‘Peaceful Rise’. Due to the problematic connotations of ‘rise’, the concept later became Peaceful Development before it was rejected in favor of Harmonious World. Hu Jintao put forward Harmonious World to explain the Chinese vision for the world (Hu 2005). Harmonious World explicitly draws its inspiration from the ancient Chinese culture of harmony and its recent revival in philosophy and international relations, for example that of Zhao Tingyang (Callahan 2008). The architects behind the Harmonious World policy are widely considered to be president Hu Jintao and Yu Keping, a professor at Peking University and deputy director of the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Glaser and Medeiros 2007, 294; Callahan 2008, 738).
What is remarkable about the Chinese case is that most parts of the Chinese security network—from scholars at universities and think tanks to policymakers—seem to have aligned their resources to explain the world why China will rise peacefully. It is tempting to conclude that this common telos is the automatic product of China’s geopolitical rise or authoritarian government directives, yet closer analysis shows that the relation between these actors is far from hierarchical but rather a networked web of national and international, government, military and civilian actors (Kristensen and Nielsen 2010). Despite their common telos, the Chinese security network is debating the means to ensure the peaceful rise of China, and even if this is the correct term. Networks consisting of both policymakers, bureaucrats, civil activists, intellectuals, and scholars have combined variegated scientific discourses—Western ideas on complex interdependence as well as ancient Confucian philosophy—to build “soft power with Chinese characteristics” (Glaser and Murphy 2009).

Also interesting for further research is the important role played by ancient cultural and intellectual resources in this political reassurance strategy towards its neighbors and the West. Part of the intellectual revisionism builds on a negation of what is considered to be ‘Western’ concepts such as anarchy, conflict and power politics and is also stimulated by the increasing popularity of civilizational concepts such as Greater China and Confucian harmony (Callahan 2004, 2008). These alternative representations take an indigenous rather than universal or global stance by devising civilizational and national discourses; they are not theories, strategies or political visions but *Chinese* theories, strategies or political visions. Similar tendencies can be traced in other rising non-Western powers. Among Indian policymakers, “reference to Ashoka, Buddha, and Gandhi continues to be a diplomatic catchphrase.” (Upadhyaya 2009, 79) and scholars turn to ancient philosophers such as Kautilya and Asoka in order to understand Indian security strategy (Bandyopadhyaya 2003; Zaman 2006). There are indications of a revival of “Indian ways of knowing” composed by a non-violent ethos (Behera 2007). Brazilian scholars and policymakers are emphasizing “Brazilian concepts” and are “particularly concerned with the absolute need to view and think IR through a Brazilian prism” (Cervo 2008; Ferreira-Pereira and Resende 2010). There is room for further examinations of the dynamics behind these quests for alternative security strategies that expose the civilizational nature of future great powers.

A comparative analysis of the use of security expertise in the formulation of security strategy in three different rising powers can serve to examine: (1) Networks: How do the BRICs mobilize their national security networks around common projects, like the ‘peaceful rise of China’? That is, how do different rising powers assemble networks of security experts with various security rationalities. How do debates and disagreements between different network actors affect this process, and do varying degrees of freedom of expression among the BRIC countries explain the homo- or heterogeneity in outcome? What knowledge forms are demanded from these agents: applied, instrumental, theoretical, or others? (2) Institutions: What is the institutional environment of security studies? What actors are being recruited in the security network the different cases, only government officials and researchers from governmental think tanks, or are university scholars and even civil activists or public intellectuals involved? What is the relation between state institutions and the use of expert advice, how do democratic and authoritarian rising powers use security experts? (3) Strategy: How they are used in the formulation of national security strategies. How is the development of intellectual capacities and science policy related to security strategy?

**Literature review – security studies and rising powers**

The existing research drawn upon in this research proposal can be organized into three clusters: (1) research on rising powers, (2) research on non-Western perspectives on international relations, (3) and the literature on security knowledge production and strategy formulation.
Rising powers

Much attention in security studies is being paid to rising powers and global power transitions, particularly the relative decline of the US (Ikenberry 2008; Layne 2009; Zakaria 2008) and the growing economic, military, and political clout of non-Western countries (Khanna 2008; Mahbubani 2008) known as the BRICs (an acronym coined by Goldman Sachs 2003). However, the majority of the security literature on rising powers is guided by materialist-realist power transition and power parity theories (Gilpin 1981; Organski and Kugler 1981) received more cites than ever in 2009 and 2010, respectively. For a review and critique, see S. Chan 2008). It is guided by the classical realist question of rising power revisionism: will emerging powers integrate into economic, financial, political institutions, and the existing world order, or try to revise it (the tension between rising and status quo powers, or what classical realist Carr 1939 called haves and have-nots and Morgenthau 1948 called revisionist and status quo power; is now found in its neoclassical version in Schweller 1994, 1999; Christensen 1996b; Zakaria 1999). In line with the neoclassical realist research program, a range of studies have opened the black box of domestic policymaking processes and national interest formation in the formulation of grand strategy, for example in China (Christensen 1996a; Deng and Fei-Ling Wang 2005; Fewsmith and Rosen 2001; Garver 2006; Hao and Hou 2009; Lieberthal 2007; Nathan and R. S. Ross 1998) where there has also been some kleminology-style research on Chinese think tanks to gain knowledge about future Chinese foreign policy-making (Gill and Mulvenon 2002; Glaser and Saunders 2002; Medeiros 2004; Naughton 2002; Shambaugh 1987, 2002; Wortzel and Scobell 2004). This literature studies rising power centers, like this research proposal, but tends to apply deductive frameworks based on universal and materialist assumptions that are not sensitive to the comparative differences between rising powers and their ways of knowing and conceptualizing security strategy. Simply put, they are looking at power and ‘traditional’ security but cannot see its variations.

Non-western IR

There is a growing body of research that addresses the above-mentioned discursive revisionism, counter-hegemony, and attempts to develop non-Western perspectives on IR. In fact, critical and reflectivist IR seems strangely tantalized by the idea of non-western IR and recent years have witnessed more edited volumes on the topic than ever (Acharya and Buzan 2010; Lizée 2011; Shilliam 2010; Tickner and Wæver 2009; International Studies Review Symposium 2008 (4); International Political Sociology Forum 2009 (3); International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2007 (3)). It seems that the radicals of the periphery—who tend to receive most of the attention in this ‘thinking past the West’ literature (Bilgin 2008)—in their own peculiar way confirm what critical ‘post’-hyphenated IR scholars have long insisted about the conceptual apparatus in International Relations: concepts like the state, anarchy, sovereignty, and international are not universal, but contingent and Western. This literature is sensitive to alternative ways of knowing and conceptualizing security but remains single-case oriented, specific, and thus perhaps too sensitive to differences and radical otherness. This sensitivity is most extremely embodied in the literature on “vernacular security” in Indonesian villages (Bubandt 2005) or Cambodian temples (Kent 2006). Most studies of non-Western security concepts furthermore tend to focus on the conceptual and discursive level, while it remains atheoretical on the question of how knowledge production relates to the political-strategic level. Simply put, this literature sees the variation and differences but is not looking at power and ‘traditional’ security.

This thesis should not be confused with a postmodern critique of ‘Eurocentrism’ or ‘Western hegemony’, instead it follows the argument of actor-network-theory that ”dispersion, destruction, and deconstruction are not the goals to be achieved but what needs to be overcome. It’s much more important to check what are the new institutions, procedures, and concepts able to collect and to reconnect the social.” (Latour 2007, 11). It studies how emerging powers are trying to assemble new modes of order and ways of thinking about security that may or may not be radically different from existing western ones. The literature on non-Western security is no doubt useful to the present project, but in order to know more about alternative ways of conceptualizing security, there is a need move
from the fact that such differences exists to their nature. In this task both of the literatures above are relevant but the main theoretical framework I propose to theorize the link between security expertise and the political-strategic level is found in the sociological literature on knowledge production.

**Sociological approaches to knowledge production**

The sociology of science is a broad and diffuse research field that encompasses scholars from Marx and Mannheim to Foucault and Bourdieu (for an overview, see Camic and Gross 2004; Stehr and Meja 2005). The part introduced in this research proposal addresses questions at the interplay of science and policy-making, and could be called science-policy or policy-science. It addresses questions on the use of scientific advice in policymaking and the democratic accountability of experts (Jasanoff 2005; Maasen and Weingart 2005). For example, how the advisory process can rarely be restricted to technical issues that enlighten decision-makers prior to making decisions, but politics can become scientized (by asserting that there are certain value-free and systematic methods for dealing with it, and only these) while science can become politicized (when shared epistemes are created and achieve standing in the political realm) (Jasanoff 1994, 1996); Do policymakers value expertise because it improves policy decisions or simply because it lends authority to their preferences or to signal capacity to make sound decisions? (Boswell 2009); Does society speak back to science with demands of applied and relevant knowledge forms also known as mode-2 knowledge? (Gibbons et al. 1994). Also relevant to the study of how policymakers in the three cases use expert advice are comparative studies of expert cultures (Jasanoff 1986) and, to some extent, comparative studies on think tanks (Stone and Maxwell 2005). It should be noted, however, that the empirical focus of this literature has primarily been Western democracies, and thus the question of variation in political systems and mechanisms for political accountability demands further research when applying it to the cases of Brazil, India and China. This dimension can benefit from research on the relationship between social science and state-building (Wagner and Wittrock 1991b, 1991a). Although its empirical focus is also Europe, it is sensitive towards the interaction between different intellectual traditions and state-building projects and how coalitions form between researchers and policy actors when their respective research programs and policy programs become mutually reinforcing.

This policy-science literature is particularly useful for the analysis of institutional environments of advisory, that is, relations between policy and expert institutions at the meso- and macro-level, but it offers little help for the analysis of micro-level interactions and the network relations among security actors. The micro-analysis, I suggest, can benefit from methodological developments in Science and technology studies (STS). STS is another field under the broad umbrella of the sociology of science but distinguishes itself from policy-science by studying specifically the production, rather than use, of scientific knowledge. STS is more united by its research questions and methods than its theories. STS research focuses on the production of scientific truths in its most immediate local and social context to show how scientific results are reached through contingent and sometimes coincidental social processes (see the summary in Diesing 1991). Most work has been done on natural and technological sciences, that is, in laboratories (Knorr-Cetina 1995; Latour 1987; Latour and Woolgar 1986) and it has only recently been introduced to the study of social science research, and remains almost absent in IR (Büger and Gadinger 2007). The literature I propose to integrate into the study of security knowledge production in rising powers is the micro-sociological and ethnmethodological research associated with actor-network-theory because it provides a range of tools generally applicable to map networks and trace associations while at the same time having its origin in the study of knowledge production (Latour 2007; Law and Hassard 1999). The methodological focus on the local practices of security experts ties well onto recent developments in security studies.

Recently, it has been argued that ”security studies needs a sociological analysis of its workings” (Wæver 2010, 649; see also Wæver 1998; Büger and Gadinger 2007). And critical security scholars have turned their attention to the role of security analysts (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006). This literature conceptualizes security as a social practice and focuses on various types of security practitioners and
experts—scholars as well as professionals—and relates to the ‘practice turn’ in IR (Neumann 2002; see also Adler and Pouliot 2011). Knowledge production is at the center of their mapping of networks of security analysts, particularly how various forms of expertise such as ‘social statistics’ (Bigo and Guild 2005) or ‘theory’ (Villumsen 2008) put experts in a position of authority as primary actors to identify strategies to address security problems (see also Büger and Villumsen 2007; D. Kennedy 2002). To follow the sociological line of research in the context of this study involves tracing how agencies that possess different security rationalities and knowledge forms try to establish authority and build alliances with other agencies, as, for example, when conflicting Chinese elites use expert advice in support of their own preferred policy. Also relevant here is the research on “epistemic communities” and “practice communities” that addresses the epistemic power of knowledge producing agencies and technocratic elites on policy formulation (Adler 2005, 2009; Adler and Haas 1992; Haas 1992, 1997).

The claim of the sociological line of research is that networks of security experts, by virtue of their expertise and knowledge production, are thus involved in defining (in)security, a micro-level process which has been largely neglected by the more discursively oriented security theories (e.g. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998). There are some parallels, though. In the same way that “securitization” as a speech act initiates a process of closure and decisionism while “politicization” is a process of contestation, openness, and conflict (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), I argue that “scientization’ can be considered an alternative process of closure, if successful. However, with grand strategy as well as other politicized issues, “there is typically no single universally agreed upon, correct outcome to these sorts of assessments. Incoherence, not consensus, is the normal epistemological condition in many domains of policy-relevant knowledge.” (Jasanoff 2005). In such cases, scientists can no longer stand on secured platforms of knowledge.

In sum, critical and reflectivist security scholars have increasing turned to microsociological studies of the practices of security experts. However, they have focused mainly on non-traditional security issues—such as migration, human security, terrorism, environmental security—and left the analysis of war, power politics, rising powers, and grand strategy to traditional realist security studies. This empirical division of labor is not fruitful and may be one of the reasons why the American mainstream that takes a traditionalist and state-centric perspective on security has thus far paid little attention to critical security research. This thesis aims to contribute to the critical security literature while at the same time entering the empirical domain of traditionalists.

**Research design and chapter outline**

The purpose of the research design is to operationalize the main research question into a viable methodological and empirical research strategy. The main research question can be dissected into five sub-questions that are allocated a chapter each:

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<tr>
<th>How do rising powers mobilize security expertise in the formulation of national security strategies?</th>
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<td>Chapter 1. Puzzle and disposition</td>
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**The theoretical and methodological dimensions**

| Chapter 2. How can security expertise be studied theoretically? |
| Chapter 3. How can security expertise be studied methodologically? |

**The empirical dimensions**

| Chapter 4. How have local networks of security experts been assembled in the three cases the post-cold war period? |
| Chapter 5. How have the organizational and material bases of security experts and their access to policymaking developed in the three cases the post-cold war period? |
| Chapter 6. How have security experts contributed to the formulation of national security strategies in the three cases the post-cold war period? |
Chapter 1. Puzzle and disposition

The thesis will unfold its overall argument in six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the puzzle. Chapters 2-3 ask how to study security expertise theoretically and methodologically. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework inspired by sociological theories of expertise. Chapter 3 develops a methodology to study social networks. It synchronizes micro-sociological theory with an ‘interactionist’ methodology inspired by ethnomethodology to analyze qualitative interviews and study scholars, researchers and policymakers at the micro-level (Garfinkel 1967). Chapters 4-6 ask the empirical question how do rising powers mobilize security expertise in the formulation of national security strategies? The main argument proceeds by mapping (1) the local context of security practitioners and their network positions, then moves through (2) the institutional and organizational environment of universities, think tanks, and policy institutes to (3) the policymaking level of national security strategy formulation.

Chapter 2. Theorizing security expertise

Where most studies of non-Western security concepts tend to be overly focused on the conceptual and discursive level, this PhD proposal emphasizes how the construction of new security strategies and concepts is also a process of building institutional coalitions and informal networks. It focuses on the social dynamics involved in building the security networks that formulate security strategy and alternative strategic concepts, i.e. how emerging powers mobilize intellectual resources. Its theoretical framework is inspired by the third literature outlined above, sociological approaches to knowledge production. In the anti-reductionist spirit of microsociology, it takes the dynamics among security researchers and practitioners as point of departure, rather than the macro-level of the balance of power or foreign policy discourses. It aims not to reduce these developments to the workings of macro-social entities, class struggles, anti-colonialism, political authoritarianism, or geopolitical balances of power. Theoretically, it thus challenges both the materialist argument that knowledge production is a product of similar macro- and geopolitical environments (‘every great power needs a vision of world order’) as well as the discursive argument that sees it as reaction to Western hegemonic discourses.

Indeed, China, India, and Brazil share some similarities with regard to geopolitical position (expanding foreign policy interests and influence) material bases (growing GDP and investment in science), and, in part, colonial histories. But it is pertinent to set up a comparative framework that takes into account how state-building, foreign policy behavior, expert culture, political culture and organization, degrees of idea import from the US/West vis-à-vis indigenous philosophies, and other such factors may affect intellectual innovation in rising powers and the kind of knowledge produced (see for example the variables in Waever 1998; Breitenbauch 2008; Breitenbauch and Wivel 2004). For example, despite some macro-level similarities, Brazil and India do not display the same explicit intellectual revisionism in the direction of a distinctly non-Western outlook that China does. Different institutional setups with different distances between knowledge producing agencies and policymakers may also affect the knowledge produced: Indian security studies which are largely isolated from policymaking are also more critical and peace-oriented than the instrumental and technological Chinese security network that is more closely connected to policymaking. This is also the case in Brazil, and South America in general, where close relations between the state and science has led to a focus on practical knowledge forms (lo práctico) that are useful to policymaking (Tickner 2008). In studying this connection, it draws on methodological tools from the micro-sociological and network-oriented sociology of knowledge (Collins 1998; Latour 1987, 2007; Latour and Woolgar 1986).

Chapter 3. A methodology to map social networks

Social network methods have seen a revival in International Relations scholarship in recent years

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2 Others have shown that closeness to power produced a rationalist social science in the United States while distance from power has produced more critical, reflectivist, and historicist approaches in Europe (Hoffmann 1977, Waever 1998).
(Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; Lazer 2011; Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011). It is (almost too) obvious for a discipline that has both ‘inter’ and ‘relations’ in its name to engage in a dialogue with network methodology that conceptualizes power as a product of relations, associations, and in-betweenness rather than as a characteristic of units and their capabilities. Despite growing interest, social network analysis (SNA) has found only a narrow audience among formal modelers and large-n researchers. Mainstream applications use network analysis to study bargaining power among connected actors and the social capital assigned to nodes in the form of access, brokerage, and exit options (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006; Lazer 2011; Maoz 2010; Maoz et al. 2005). These approaches are concerned with network centrality as the quantity and quality of communicative associations between actors.

This thesis aims to introduce network analytics to reflectivist IR. Social network analysis is widely used in communication studies and the vocabulary of social network analysis is not completely alien to discourse analysis. Another strand of network analytics is actor-network-theory (ANT). ANT is not a theory about the social but a methodological perspective on how actor-network are formed, reproduce themselves, evolve, or disintegrate. It differs from the formalistic SNA applications by focusing on the productive and definitional power in the assembling of networks in the first place, as exemplified the idea that those ‘who are powerful are not those who “hold” power in principle, but those who practically define and redefine what “holds” everyone together’ (Latour 1986, 273). ANT is primarily concerned with ‘translations’: the practice of network-building where agents enroll others into a network by problematizations and the deployment of ‘interessement devices’, that is, by making other actors accept the problem, align with the network project, and enroll as allies. Translation, in other words, involves the strategies through which an actor identifies other actors and arranges them in relation to each other (Callon et al. 1983)—the alignment of security experts to support China’s Peaceful Rise strategy being a case in point. The strategic use of discourses to recruit members and forge common identities into a coherent network plays an important role in this process. This approach makes ANT particularly relevant for the analysis of how emerging powers build security networks.

As a theory about controversies, it studies how some interactions end up being stabilized at the expense of others and how network centers and peripheries are constructed. At stake is the right to define how, when, by whom and to what extent science will be integrated into solution of security problems (and who will frame these problems?). Such questions straddle the line between science and politics, theory and practice, truth and power. Any attempt to answer them must address the boundary drawings of where the role of science ends and politics and policy begins. Attempts are made, probably differently in the three cases, to draw clear lines between science and politics. But rather than participating as part in it, these boundary struggles should be the subject of analysis.

Chapter 4. Mapping networks of security expertise

This chapter applies the theoretical framework and the network methodology on the empirical cases. It analyzes (1) the associations and groupings among security experts in the three cases, and (2) the kind of knowledge and conceptual assemblages they produce. The mapping of the security networks of the BRICs starts by following the trace of three types of agents: scholars at universities, researchers at think tanks, and technocratic-bureaucratic elites in government institutions. In the mapping of expert cultures in the three cases, the analysis focuses on what ties security experts together. As opposed to the following chapter on institutional setting, this one applies a thoroughly micro-sociological methodology and an “interactionist interviewing” method (Denzin 1989; Gubrium and Holstein 1997, 2003; Järvinen and Mik-Meyer 2005). Thus I follow the ethnomethodological argument that social interaction can only be studied in relation to the interactive methods employed by actors themselves to create meaning and maintain reality (Garfinkel 1967). The appreciation of meaning making processes, in addition to meaning,

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3 The idea of nodal points as central concepts that tie together a discourse, for example, is a central concept in SNA.
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derives from ethnomethodologically inspired social constructivism (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Blumer 1969; Garfinkel 1967). Interactionist methodology studies the procedures producing social order rather than order per se, or, in other words, the meaning making rather than the meanings of Brazilian security experts. The idea is that as security experts interact over time, they create particular ways of talking, thinking, and interacting. Being a Brazilian security expert involves seeing the world in a particular way, to draw on a common body of knowledge, and present oneself in socially appropriate ways. These cultural practices constitute network membership and demarcate other networks.

Following ANT and ethnomethodology, I will rely primarily on personal in-depth interviews to map connections and networks. The main empirical source will be local interviews with researchers, scholars, and policymakers/bureaucrats (which is basically the same in China). As should be clear by now, the focus of this research proposal is the how, not what, of security strategy formulation, that is, the mapping of networks and meaning making. Concerning the “openness of purpose” (Kvale 1996, 127), however, the immediate purpose of the interviews will be to talk to Brazilian researchers and policymakers about Brazil’s security strategy, while implicitly studying the meaning making and network connections employed in this effort. This calls for a combination of structure (predetermined themes) regarding the former and room for agency (a more open and unstructured approach) regarding the latter. I thus expect to conduct semi-structured in-depth interviews with a question guide that works to balance the sociological framework in its focus on form with the IR/security content.

The data collection for this chapter will be the most time consuming, but also the key empirical contribution of the thesis. At a minimum it entails fieldwork in Brazil and India, since I already did some research that might be relevant for the China case (interviews with 27 scholars and think tank researchers), which could be supplemented by telephone interviews. These interviews have provided me with a solid network among some of China’s most prominent foreign policy advisors (Qin Yaqing, Wang Jisi, Wang Yizhou, Yan Xuetong, Li Bin, and many others) and thus potentially to policymakers and bureaucrats. In the other two cases, I expect to utilize the network of Centre for Advanced Security Theory (CAST) where I have been affiliated the past two years (e.g. Navnita Behera in India).

Taking a micro-level and qualitative perspective on networks does not mean that one should not study the quantitative and formalistic characteristics of networks, however. For example, the study of networks among security experts can benefit from visualizations of linkages to international networks. The image below shows the network of authorships in leading academic IR journals in the 2000s:
This type of network analysis provides an example of how to analyze associations and information flows in an academic security network using quantitative data. The network shows a predominance of European and North American authors in leading security and IR journals, and that the majority of cooperation in terms of co-authorships is trans-Atlantic (as indicated by the lines). The security experts of Brazil, India, and China are weakly integrated into this particular international expert network. The method can be further developed to study which actors—in the traditional sense of states, institutions, people and actors as concepts, semiotic constellations, or technologies—are most central to the information flows, who sets the discursive terms for security, what is the relation between developed and developing world? In addition to this, it is interesting to study the publications in the three cases at hand, how far do associations and links extend from national network centers and how the three cases relate to each other? There are indications of highly nationalized security networks that have historically been decoupled from global security networks. This may have added to the trend of developing particularly non-Western perspectives on security.

Data for such quantitative analyses can be harvested at online databases. Thus, quantitative methods can work as a useful supplement to the qualitative network analysis. I have only recently started to explore quantitative network analytics and expect to take courses on this if granted a PhD scholarship.

Chapter 5. The organizational and institutional setup

This chapter analyzes the formal institutional setup of security agencies: university systems, think tank structure, and policymaking institutions. It relies on secondary sources.


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4 Data is derived from the articles publications in nine leading academic IR journals: International Organization, International Security, World Politics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Peace Research, European Journal of International Relations, Review of International Studies, Millennium – Journal of International Studies. These journals are selected because they represent the top academic journals in the field according to reputational surveys among scholars (Garand and Giles 2003; Giles and Garand 2007; Giles, Mizzel, and Patterson 1989; Maliniak, Oakes, and Tierney 2009) and citation based rankings (ISI Web of Science). I have also chosen these journals to achieve comparability with previous research (Goldmann 1995; Wæver 1998; Aydinli and Mathews 2000; Breuning, Bredehoft, and Walton 2005).

5 For example, a study of citation patterns of Chinese political science journals and their international counterparts has found that Chinese and international communication systems in the social sciences are almost decoupled (Zhou, Su, and Leydesdorff 2010, 1362). Further evidence of decoupling is provided by the fact that no single Chinese journal covered by the domestic Chinese Social Science Citation Index (CSSCI) is also covered by the international SSCI, the contribution of international scholars to Chinese domestic journals in the social sciences is virtually absent, and the non-source citations of Chinese authors in domestic journals to international literature are very sparse.

6 Scielo (Scientific Eletronic Library Online) Brazil contains the most important Brazilian journals such as Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacionall, Contexto Internacional (15 issues available, 2003-2009) and Carta Internacional, Politica Externa. CNKI (http://en.cnki.com.cn), Chinese Social Science Citation Index (CSSCI), Chinese Humanities and Social Science Citation Database (CHSSCD) and other databases comprise the large number of Chinese publications in International Relations and security studies (CSSCI 2010; Su, Xinning Han, and Xinning Han 2001; Zhou, Su, and Leydesdorff 2010). The English language journals Chinese Journal of International Politics and Social Sciences in China are available online. Indian journals International Studies are available online. National variations in publication patterns should, of course, be accounted for in making such a comparative analysis. It has been argued that in Brazil, for example, “IR publication is less driven by journals and more by monographs, perhaps due to the rather small number of available avenues for publication.” (Kenkel 2003, 123).
An organizational factor that affects the openness towards civilian knowledge producers such as universities is whether governments have their own think tanks. The comparative analysis of organizational setup will therefore make use of comparative and single-case studies of national think tank environments, advisory, and policymaking institutions. The comparative think tank literature shows how think tanks as organizational form is growing in numbers all over the world (Stone and Maxwell 2005), but particularly so in the BRICs. According to a global survey of think tanks, China, India, and Brazil have grown to possess the second, third and thirteenth largest number of think tanks in the world—just two years ago they ranked 12th, 6th and 24th, respectively. In absolute figures, China had 74 registered think tanks in 2008 and 425 in 2010, second only to the United States (1816) (McGann 2011). There has been a proliferation of think tanks and public policy institutes that provide input to policy debates. The comparative think tank literature tends to focus on institutional setup, funding sources, and policy influence, however, and rarely does it address the nature of think tanks and the security expertise they produce. The large country-specific literature on think tanks does this, at least to some extent, but this literature has no basis for comparison. In the case of China there is a large and expanding literature on think tanks and policymaking institutions (Gill and Mulvenon 2002; Glaser and Saunders 2002; Li 2009; Liao 2006; Medeiros 2004; Naughton 2002; Shambaugh 1987, 2002; Wortzel and Scobell 2004; Xuefeng Zhu and Teng 2006; Xufeng Zhu 2009; Xufeng Zhu and Xue 2007) and how Chinese intellectual elites view the world and debate the future of international relations (Deng and S. Gray 2001; Leonard 2008, 2009; Lynch 2009). However, this literature makes no distinction between, or even conflates, political and intellectual elites (Ren 2010). This is not without reason, of course, but if intellectuals are indeed influential in policy circles it is worth investigating the links rather than assuming them to be there. The same can be said about the Brazilian case (Kenkel 2003) while there is a clearer demarcation between scholars and policymakers in the Indian context where the think tank link is largely missing (Alagappa 2010; Baru 2009; Mohan 2010).

Chapter 6. The security strategy and policymaking process
The purpose of this chapter is to, first, study the national security strategies of the three cases in the post-Cold War period and, second, to analyze the impact of security experts and how it has evolved over time. I suggest a focus on the post-Cold War period because this relatively long time period allows for significant variation and progress in the use of experts, and because this specific period after the fall of the bipolar world system is when the three countries in case have formulated gradually more activist security strategies. Given the continued sensitivity of policy-making processes in several of the cases, particularly with regard to ‘grand strategy’ formulation, sources remain rare. I thus expect the mapping of post-Cold War grand strategies in the three cases to employ a combination of sources. Its primary source will be secondary, academic literature. It will also use official documents and speeches. For example, The Ministry of Defense of Brazil publishes a National Defense Strategy (Estratégia Nacional de Defesa) as does the Indian Ministry of Defense. The government of the People’s Republic of China publishes neither a formal National Security Strategy nor a National Defense Strategy, but since 1998 it has presented defense “white papers” that express its view on defense and security issues. These papers published by the Information Office of the State Council present the closest one gets to a Beijing government “assessment of China’s national security environment” (Shambaugh 2004, 59). The analysis can be supplemented by analyzing publications by senior officials at the National Defense University in Beijing. In addition to official papers, I also expect this chapter to analyze speeches held by key foreign policymakers since strategic concepts, such as Peaceful Rise, are often presented in public speeches rather than official documents.
Conclusions and contributions

My former research on China has provided me with insight and access to security studies in China but was more narrowly focused on academic security studies than this proposal. This project embarks on a broader mapping of security agencies in academia through think tanks to policymakers using network analytical tools. Due to the inductive and micro-oriented methodology of such a project it is difficult to perform any pre-analysis prior to the fieldwork. Nevertheless, I do expect to identify constellations of these different security agencies that, although they come from distinct organizational bases with distinct security rationalities, engage in network and alliance building. I expect to find a deepening and widening of scientific advisory processes in rising powers and that this knowledge production is not limited to technical and policy-specific knowledge but also theoretical and normative ideas about rising power behavior. The project has relevance along several lines:

- It provides empirical insight into the security policymaking of future great powers.
- It provides knowledge about expert advisory processes and political decision-making.
- It contributes to the theoretical development at the research front of critical security studies.
- It contributes with a practice-founded theorization of the power/knowledge nexus.
- It contributes with insights into non-Western ideas about security and thus brings critical research beyond the stage of merely deconstructing Western concepts.
- It contributes with a sociological development of security theory that speaks to both reflectivist and traditionalist strands by applying theories from the sociology of knowledge on a largely ‘traditionalist’ subject (grand strategy).

Proposed supervisor

Professor Ole Wæver (University of Copenhagen) who has done research on non-Western IR (Tickner and Wæver 2009), security studies (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), and sociology of science (Wæver 1998, 2007, 2010, 2010). External co-supervisors could be Alastair Iain Johnston (Harvard University) who has done research on Chinese foreign policy (Johnston 2003), strategic culture (Johnston 1995) and its IR community (Johnston 2002). Also relevant are Didier Bigo and Bruno Latour (both Sciences-Po), leading figures in security studies and actor-network-theory, respectively.

Outcome and feasibility

I have previously conducted three weeks of fieldwork in China which included interviews with 27 researchers at universities and think tanks. My experience is that this is sufficient qualitative data material for a single case analysis. I thus consider it feasible to conduct fieldwork of approximately the same duration in Brazil and India. I also expect to supplement this with some telephone interviews. As a part of my Master’s thesis, I also conducted a questionnaire among Chinese IR researchers. For reasons of feasibility this type of data generation is not part of this research proposal, but if time allows it would provide some interesting comparative data.

In addition to the fieldwork, I plan on spending semester abroad: Either with Alastair Iain Johnston at Harvard University with whom I am already in contact regarding my Master’s thesis. Alternatively, it would be relevant to be visiting scholar with Didier Bigo and Bruno Latour at Sciences-Po in Paris, the former of whom is part of the network at CAST.

I plan to teach two courses: One on ‘Security in a post-Western world’ and another on ‘Think tanks and experts in the policymaking process’. I expect the first course to be taught in the spring
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semester 2012 and the second in the spring semester 2013. I expect the outcome of the PhD project to be a monograph and possibly two peer-reviewed articles relating to the subjects of the courses taught. I already have several articles in the pipeline, one on network analytics in International Relations (submitted to International Studies Review), one on interdisciplinarity in International Relations (to be presented at the annual convention of the Danish Association for Political Science, November 2011) and one on the construction of a Chinese school of International Relations (to be presented at the British Inter-University China Centre at Oxford University, UK, September 1-2, 2011). I expect to finish all of them within the first semester of the PhD scholarship and hopefully to have time to write further articles alongside the research for the monograph.

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