Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment
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Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations : evidence from a conjoint experiment. / Pedersen, Mogens Jin; Favero, Nathan; Park, Joohyung.
I: Public Management Review , 09.08.2023.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations
T2 - evidence from a conjoint experiment
AU - Pedersen, Mogens Jin
AU - Favero, Nathan
AU - Park, Joohyung
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2023/8/9
Y1 - 2023/8/9
N2 - Does pay-for-performance–a hotly debated compensation scheme for incentivizing public service efficiency–induce inadvertent heterogeneity in job attraction that is counteracting the prospects of bureaucratic diversity and representation? Using data from a pre-registered conjoint experiment among US residents (n = 1,501), we examine whether pay-for-performance (compared to fixed pay) affects attraction to a public service job differently across race, gender, and age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that pay-for-performance does not diminish attraction to a public service job within or between demographic groups. In fact, we find indications that pay-for-performance may enhance job attractiveness among individuals identifying with minority racial groups.
AB - Does pay-for-performance–a hotly debated compensation scheme for incentivizing public service efficiency–induce inadvertent heterogeneity in job attraction that is counteracting the prospects of bureaucratic diversity and representation? Using data from a pre-registered conjoint experiment among US residents (n = 1,501), we examine whether pay-for-performance (compared to fixed pay) affects attraction to a public service job differently across race, gender, and age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that pay-for-performance does not diminish attraction to a public service job within or between demographic groups. In fact, we find indications that pay-for-performance may enhance job attractiveness among individuals identifying with minority racial groups.
KW - equity
KW - pay-for-performance
KW - recruitment
KW - representative bureaucracy
KW - survey experiment
KW - recruitment
KW - pay-for-performance
KW - representative bureaucracy
KW - equity
KW - survey experiment
U2 - 10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841
DO - 10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85167655087
JO - Public Management Review
JF - Public Management Review
SN - 1471-9037
ER -
ID: 369988878