Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

Co-operation as currency : how active coalitions affect lobbying success. / Junk, Wiebke Marie.

I: Journal of European Public Policy, Bind 27, Nr. 6, 2020, s. 873-892.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Junk, WM 2020, 'Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success', Journal of European Public Policy, bind 27, nr. 6, s. 873-892. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377

APA

Junk, W. M. (2020). Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success. Journal of European Public Policy, 27(6), 873-892. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377

Vancouver

Junk WM. Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success. Journal of European Public Policy. 2020;27(6): 873-892. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377

Author

Junk, Wiebke Marie. / Co-operation as currency : how active coalitions affect lobbying success. I: Journal of European Public Policy. 2020 ; Bind 27, Nr. 6. s. 873-892.

Bibtex

@article{5460aad4815e45b9946e5c7b34e53eca,
title = "Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success",
abstract = "Coalition action is a common lobbying strategy to exert influence over policy, but is rarely addressed in studies of lobbying success. This article adds to resource exchange theory, firstly, that active co-operation with others to gather information, optimize strategies and jointly signal a position should increase lobbying success similarly to spending economic resources on lobbying on an issue individually. Secondly, it expects important interactions between active co-operation and economic resources, because the costs and benefits of co-operation will be distributed unequally among partners who invest different levels of resources themselves. Using new survey data on lobbying on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article provides strong support for these expectations: Active co-operation on an issue increases lobbying success measured as perceived influence. Moreover, it mediates the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success.These findings have important methodological and normative implications regarding alternatives pathways of lobbying power.",
author = "Junk, {Wiebke Marie}",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = " 873--892",
journal = "Journal of European Public Policy",
issn = "1350-1763",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Co-operation as currency

T2 - how active coalitions affect lobbying success

AU - Junk, Wiebke Marie

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Coalition action is a common lobbying strategy to exert influence over policy, but is rarely addressed in studies of lobbying success. This article adds to resource exchange theory, firstly, that active co-operation with others to gather information, optimize strategies and jointly signal a position should increase lobbying success similarly to spending economic resources on lobbying on an issue individually. Secondly, it expects important interactions between active co-operation and economic resources, because the costs and benefits of co-operation will be distributed unequally among partners who invest different levels of resources themselves. Using new survey data on lobbying on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article provides strong support for these expectations: Active co-operation on an issue increases lobbying success measured as perceived influence. Moreover, it mediates the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success.These findings have important methodological and normative implications regarding alternatives pathways of lobbying power.

AB - Coalition action is a common lobbying strategy to exert influence over policy, but is rarely addressed in studies of lobbying success. This article adds to resource exchange theory, firstly, that active co-operation with others to gather information, optimize strategies and jointly signal a position should increase lobbying success similarly to spending economic resources on lobbying on an issue individually. Secondly, it expects important interactions between active co-operation and economic resources, because the costs and benefits of co-operation will be distributed unequally among partners who invest different levels of resources themselves. Using new survey data on lobbying on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article provides strong support for these expectations: Active co-operation on an issue increases lobbying success measured as perceived influence. Moreover, it mediates the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success.These findings have important methodological and normative implications regarding alternatives pathways of lobbying power.

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377

M3 - Journal article

VL - 27

SP - 873

EP - 892

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

SN - 1350-1763

IS - 6

ER -

ID: 223926164