European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005 : A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations? / Nedergaard, Peter.

I: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Bind 9, Nr. 1, 2009, s. 17-47.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Nedergaard, P 2009, 'European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?', Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, bind 9, nr. 1, s. 17-47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-008-0031-4

APA

Nedergaard, P. (2009). European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations? Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 9(1), 17-47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-008-0031-4

Vancouver

Nedergaard P. European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations? Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. 2009;9(1):17-47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-008-0031-4

Author

Nedergaard, Peter. / European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005 : A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?. I: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. 2009 ; Bind 9, Nr. 1. s. 17-47.

Bibtex

@article{1297c4f0a2a611ddb5e9000ea68e967b,
title = "European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005: A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?",
abstract = "Based upon a narrative policy analysis, the aim of this paper is to answer two questions: (1) Why did the EU re-introduce import quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exports in 2005 after promising to lift them? (2) Why did the EU (partly) abolish these quotas a couple of months later? The rational choice inspired model put forward in this paper assumes that the EU's political system is a partial asymmetrical political equilibrium in which decisions taken by decision makers are a product of a supply and demand. By using this model, it is explained how the lifting of quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exports to WTO members on 1 January, 2005 and the political situation surrounding the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty on 29 May, 2005, constitute key events in the decision making process.",
author = "Peter Nedergaard",
year = "2009",
doi = "10.1007/s10842-008-0031-4",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "17--47",
journal = "Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade",
issn = "1566-1679",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - European Union Import Quotas on Chinese Textile and Clothing Exports in 2005

T2 - A Panic-Driven Commission or Rational Explanations?

AU - Nedergaard, Peter

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - Based upon a narrative policy analysis, the aim of this paper is to answer two questions: (1) Why did the EU re-introduce import quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exports in 2005 after promising to lift them? (2) Why did the EU (partly) abolish these quotas a couple of months later? The rational choice inspired model put forward in this paper assumes that the EU's political system is a partial asymmetrical political equilibrium in which decisions taken by decision makers are a product of a supply and demand. By using this model, it is explained how the lifting of quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exports to WTO members on 1 January, 2005 and the political situation surrounding the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty on 29 May, 2005, constitute key events in the decision making process.

AB - Based upon a narrative policy analysis, the aim of this paper is to answer two questions: (1) Why did the EU re-introduce import quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exports in 2005 after promising to lift them? (2) Why did the EU (partly) abolish these quotas a couple of months later? The rational choice inspired model put forward in this paper assumes that the EU's political system is a partial asymmetrical political equilibrium in which decisions taken by decision makers are a product of a supply and demand. By using this model, it is explained how the lifting of quotas on Chinese textile and clothing exports to WTO members on 1 January, 2005 and the political situation surrounding the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty on 29 May, 2005, constitute key events in the decision making process.

U2 - 10.1007/s10842-008-0031-4

DO - 10.1007/s10842-008-0031-4

M3 - Journal article

VL - 9

SP - 17

EP - 47

JO - Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade

JF - Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade

SN - 1566-1679

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 8199722