Lobbying in the EU Comitology System
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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Lobbying in the EU Comitology System. / Nørgaard, Rikke Wetendorff; Nedergaard, Peter; Blom-Hansen, Jens.
I: Journal of European Integration, Bind 36, Nr. 5, 4, 14.03.2014, s. 491-507.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Lobbying in the EU Comitology System
AU - Nørgaard, Rikke Wetendorff
AU - Nedergaard, Peter
AU - Blom-Hansen, Jens
PY - 2014/3/14
Y1 - 2014/3/14
N2 - Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.
AB - Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework. Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the comitology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases, aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament. The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology system and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the EU political system.
U2 - 10.1080/07036337.2014.889128
DO - 10.1080/07036337.2014.889128
M3 - Journal article
VL - 36
SP - 491
EP - 507
JO - Journal of European Integration
JF - Journal of European Integration
SN - 0703-6337
IS - 5
M1 - 4
ER -
ID: 90132391