TY - JOUR

T1 - Rewarding the Top

T2 - Citizens' Opposition to Higher Pay for Politicians

AU - Pedersen, Lene Holm

AU - Dahlgaard, Jens Olav

AU - Pedersen, Rasmus Tue

PY - 2019/6/27

Y1 - 2019/6/27

N2 - The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”.

AB - The rewards of politicians are a key part of the implicit contract between politicians and citizens, and the effect of these rewards on democratic legitimacy and political recruitment is a central concern in public debate and democratic theory. Using a survey experiment, we show how citizens respond to hypothetical changes in politicians’ pay. The results indicate that citizens express lower levels of trust in the politicians when these politicians award themselves higher pecuniary rewards. However, our results also show that a devious strategy in which the rewards for politicians are less transparent ensures lower opposition from citizens than open and transparent strategies. Based on this, we outline a reinvigoration of the research agenda on “rewards at the top.”.

U2 - 10.1111/1467-9477.12146

DO - 10.1111/1467-9477.12146

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85068002083

VL - 42

SP - 118

EP - 137

JO - Scandinavian Political Studies

JF - Scandinavian Political Studies

SN - 0080-6757

IS - 2

M1 - 2

ER -