The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success. / Rasmussen, Anne; Reh, Christine.
I: Journal of European Public Policy, Bind 20, Nr. 7, 01.08.2013, s. 1006-1024.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The consequences of concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-institutional bargaining success
AU - Rasmussen, Anne
AU - Reh, Christine
PY - 2013/8/1
Y1 - 2013/8/1
N2 - One of the most important changes in the history of codecision has been the steep increase in early agreements since 1999. Early agreements have enhanced the efficiency of European Union legislation, but they have been criticized for giving a subset of actors disproportionate control over the legislative agenda and negotiation process. Yet, no study has systematically shown whether and how early agreements have indeed redistributed influence between actors within the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Our contribution fills this gap by comparing actors’ bargaining success across readings under codecision in a dataset of salient files. Contrary to our theoretical predictions, we do not find evidence of distributional consequences when controlling for inter-institutional conflict and file characteristics. Where codecision is concluded early, the final legislative outcomes are not located closer to the policy positions held by the party group of the Parliament's rapporteur or by the Council Presidency.
AB - One of the most important changes in the history of codecision has been the steep increase in early agreements since 1999. Early agreements have enhanced the efficiency of European Union legislation, but they have been criticized for giving a subset of actors disproportionate control over the legislative agenda and negotiation process. Yet, no study has systematically shown whether and how early agreements have indeed redistributed influence between actors within the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Our contribution fills this gap by comparing actors’ bargaining success across readings under codecision in a dataset of salient files. Contrary to our theoretical predictions, we do not find evidence of distributional consequences when controlling for inter-institutional conflict and file characteristics. Where codecision is concluded early, the final legislative outcomes are not located closer to the policy positions held by the party group of the Parliament's rapporteur or by the Council Presidency.
KW - Bargaining success
KW - codecision
KW - early agreements
KW - party groups
KW - presidency
KW - rapporteur
U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2013.795391
DO - 10.1080/13501763.2013.795391
M3 - Journal article
VL - 20
SP - 1006
EP - 1024
JO - Journal of European Public Policy
JF - Journal of European Public Policy
SN - 1350-1763
IS - 7
ER -
ID: 66282352