Introduction The focus on deliberative democracy has increased considerably within the last decade. So far, the literature has primarily praised deliberation for its great contributions to almost any political process. Among other things, it has been argued widely that greater emphasis on deliberation would enhance the citizens’ capabilities to form reasoned and reflective opinions based on the common good rather than self-interest (Fishkin 1997; Fung 2003; Hansen 2004). Explicitly, deliberation can be defined as “an unconstrained exchange of arguments that involves practical reasoning and potentially leads to a transformation of preferences” (Cooke 2000: 948; Hansen 2004: 98). The focus on the normative potential of deliberation has to a large extent neglected deliberations’ many pitfalls and contradictions. One of the most troubling paradoxes in deliberative democracy is the equality paradox. The equality paradox of deliberation relates to the idea that deliberative democrats advocate the importance of securing that the deliberative process fulfils political equality as the participants in the deliberative process are able to express their views freely and openly without any procedural restrictions. At the same time, however, it is argued that arguments referring to the common good and public interest should and will be emphasized in a deliberative process, which favours participants accustomed to this kind of reasoning, thus compromising political equality. Deliberative democracy has also moved the debate between liberal and republican approaches to democracy, to a debate which seems to allow many approaches to democracy to find common ground for their arguments. Despite the strong and increasing attention given to deliberative democracy, not much consideration has been given to the problems and contradictions in the theory. To bridge this gap in this research area, this chapter takes up the challenge to discuss a paradox in the theory of deliberative democracy. The equality paradox in focus here entails that there is a strong tension within deliberative democracy between the ideal of unconstrained exchanges of argument, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the vision that the deliberative process should give priority to certain types of arguments that are based on reason and can be articulated on objective grounds. This chapter focuses on one aspect of the complex theory of deliberative democracy to elaborate on this empirical paradox within deliberative democracy using evidence from the 2000 Danish national Deliberative Poll regarding whether Denmark should adopt the Euro - the single European currency.