Social Policy: Problem-Solving Gaps, Partial Exits, and Court-Decision Traps
Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Notwithstanding some persistent, and likely irresolvable, problem-solving gaps, Social Europe has escaped the joint-decision trap on a regular basis. Most importantly, Treaty base games and arena shifting helped to bring about more secondary law and ECJ-driven political decisions than might have been expected considering the decision rules. Furthermore, progressive steps in European social integration were induced by a 'court-decision trap'. Two examples are studied in depth: health care, and the integration and eventual exportability of social minimum benefits. Indeed, relevant integration was deepened significantly although neither the founding persons of the Treaties nor the governments were willing to create a cross-border market for health care or open social assistance related benefits for exportability.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Titel | The EU's Decision Traps : Comparing Policies |
Forlag | Oxford University Press |
Publikationsdato | 22 sep. 2011 |
ISBN (Trykt) | 9780199596225 |
ISBN (Elektronisk) | 9780191729140 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 22 sep. 2011 |
ID: 201503683