“Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

“Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”. / Emmanuel, Nikolas George.

I: Democratization, Bind 17, Nr. 5, 10.2010.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Emmanuel, NG 2010, '“Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”', Democratization, bind 17, nr. 5.

APA

Emmanuel, N. G. (2010). “Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”. Democratization, 17(5).

Vancouver

Emmanuel NG. “Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”. Democratization. 2010 okt.;17(5).

Author

Emmanuel, Nikolas George. / “Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”. I: Democratization. 2010 ; Bind 17, Nr. 5.

Bibtex

@article{edb83c62d75f4ef6832d3feb623a58aa,
title = "“Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”",
abstract = "This study extends the debate concerning the feasibility of using foreignassistance to leverage political reforms in developing countries. This researchcombines both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an effort toexpand on the work done by previous scholars. Conclusions of the empiricalanalysis point to the finding that political conditionality is most effectivewhen close cooperation exists between donors. This coordination, however,is frequently sabotaged by self-interested donor-patrons, illustrated by thecase of Cameroon and France. This pattern is generalizable and significantlyundermines the overall success rate of a political conditionality approach.",
author = "Emmanuel, {Nikolas George}",
year = "2010",
month = oct,
language = "English",
volume = "17",
journal = "Democratization",
issn = "1351-0347",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - “Undermining Cooperation: Donor-Patrons and the Failure of Political Conditionality”

AU - Emmanuel, Nikolas George

PY - 2010/10

Y1 - 2010/10

N2 - This study extends the debate concerning the feasibility of using foreignassistance to leverage political reforms in developing countries. This researchcombines both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an effort toexpand on the work done by previous scholars. Conclusions of the empiricalanalysis point to the finding that political conditionality is most effectivewhen close cooperation exists between donors. This coordination, however,is frequently sabotaged by self-interested donor-patrons, illustrated by thecase of Cameroon and France. This pattern is generalizable and significantlyundermines the overall success rate of a political conditionality approach.

AB - This study extends the debate concerning the feasibility of using foreignassistance to leverage political reforms in developing countries. This researchcombines both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in an effort toexpand on the work done by previous scholars. Conclusions of the empiricalanalysis point to the finding that political conditionality is most effectivewhen close cooperation exists between donors. This coordination, however,is frequently sabotaged by self-interested donor-patrons, illustrated by thecase of Cameroon and France. This pattern is generalizable and significantlyundermines the overall success rate of a political conditionality approach.

M3 - Journal article

VL - 17

JO - Democratization

JF - Democratization

SN - 1351-0347

IS - 5

ER -

ID: 70308135