Lobbyists as Government Employees: Evidence from the Bureaucracy
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Lobbyists as Government Employees : Evidence from the Bureaucracy. / Egerod, Benjamin C.K.; McCrain, Joshua.
2018.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Lobbyists as Government Employees
T2 - Evidence from the Bureaucracy
AU - Egerod, Benjamin C.K.
AU - McCrain, Joshua
PY - 2018/8/20
Y1 - 2018/8/20
N2 - A growing body of research examines the transition of government employeesinto the private sector, commonly known as the revolving door. A common conclusionin this work is that government employees cash in on their experience and, mostimportantly, their connections to current officials. We focus on two under-studiedaspects of the revolving door: 1) the transition of lobbyists back into governmentand 2) the value of connections between lobbyists and government agencies. Exploitingthe unexpected victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential electionand the staggered timing of appointments into his administration, we find that firmswhose lobbyists went back through the revolving door saw 20-70% increase in revenue,and the increase was larger in Democrat-leaning firms. Our results shed lightonto the political economy of the lobbying industry and suggest a need to furtherstudy the interaction between lobbying firms and the federal bureaucracy
AB - A growing body of research examines the transition of government employeesinto the private sector, commonly known as the revolving door. A common conclusionin this work is that government employees cash in on their experience and, mostimportantly, their connections to current officials. We focus on two under-studiedaspects of the revolving door: 1) the transition of lobbyists back into governmentand 2) the value of connections between lobbyists and government agencies. Exploitingthe unexpected victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential electionand the staggered timing of appointments into his administration, we find that firmswhose lobbyists went back through the revolving door saw 20-70% increase in revenue,and the increase was larger in Democrat-leaning firms. Our results shed lightonto the political economy of the lobbying industry and suggest a need to furtherstudy the interaction between lobbying firms and the federal bureaucracy
M3 - Working paper
BT - Lobbyists as Government Employees
ER -
ID: 201165826