This paper is an intervention in two debates, one concerning the instrumental vs noninstrumental value of democracy, the other concerning the relationship between freedom and democracy. I reject the purely instrumental justification of democracy and defend the idea that democracy has noninstrumental value. I see the noninstrumental value of democracy in terms of freedom rather than the now more common reference to equality or fairness. The freedom argument can better show the noninstrumenal value of democracy and can better respond to some core objections to democratic noninstrumentalism than the equality argument. A main aim of this paper is to show that freedom and democracy are not merely instrumentally linked but, rather, intrinsically related. I argue this mainly via a critical engagement with Philip Pettit’s conception of freedom as nondomination. My defense of the noninstrumental value of democracy and the intrinsic relationship between freedom and democracy does not, however, rely on the idea that consequences don’t matter. They do, also from the perspective of a theory of freedom. If collective self-legislation has bad consequences for individual freedom this subtracts from its value, but it does not nullify it. The non-instrumental value of democracy, then, doesn’t need to be seen as independent of its instrumental value. What I shall attempt to show is that the noninstrumental value of democracy has some independent normative weight; that is, democracy has a value that cannot be derived from its consequences. And this value must be seen in terms of freedom not merely equality.