The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy: The Freedom Argument

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy : The Freedom Argument. / Rostbøll, Christian F.

I: Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory, Bind 22, Nr. 2, 06.2015, s. 267-278.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Rostbøll, CF 2015, 'The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy: The Freedom Argument', Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory, bind 22, nr. 2, s. 267-278. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12159

APA

Rostbøll, C. F. (2015). The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy: The Freedom Argument. Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory, 22(2), 267-278. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12159

Vancouver

Rostbøll CF. The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy: The Freedom Argument. Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory. 2015 jun.;22(2):267-278. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12159

Author

Rostbøll, Christian F. / The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy : The Freedom Argument. I: Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory. 2015 ; Bind 22, Nr. 2. s. 267-278.

Bibtex

@article{22146d52c6f4445e87587888a187d3eb,
title = "The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy: The Freedom Argument",
abstract = "A current debate in democratic theory concerns whether we can explain democratic legitimacy purely with reference to the intrinsic value of the public affirmation of equality, or whether we must invoke extra-democratic epistemic standards to do so. The freedom side of democracy is ignored or even rejected in this debate. But in order to understand the intrinsic value of democracy, we cannot ignore the relationship between freedom and democracy. Moreover, the freedom argument can better respond to the epistemic challenge to intrinsic accounts than can the equality argument. However, the freedom argument for democracy must be refined to avoid important objections to the idea that democracy can make citizens self-governing. The proposed freedom argument is based on notions of autonomy and freedom that have their root in the relational norm of not having another person as a master. ",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, debate",
author = "Rostb{\o}ll, {Christian F.}",
year = "2015",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1111/1467-8675.12159",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "267--278",
journal = "Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory",
issn = "1351-0487",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Non-Instrumental Value of Democracy

T2 - The Freedom Argument

AU - Rostbøll, Christian F.

PY - 2015/6

Y1 - 2015/6

N2 - A current debate in democratic theory concerns whether we can explain democratic legitimacy purely with reference to the intrinsic value of the public affirmation of equality, or whether we must invoke extra-democratic epistemic standards to do so. The freedom side of democracy is ignored or even rejected in this debate. But in order to understand the intrinsic value of democracy, we cannot ignore the relationship between freedom and democracy. Moreover, the freedom argument can better respond to the epistemic challenge to intrinsic accounts than can the equality argument. However, the freedom argument for democracy must be refined to avoid important objections to the idea that democracy can make citizens self-governing. The proposed freedom argument is based on notions of autonomy and freedom that have their root in the relational norm of not having another person as a master.

AB - A current debate in democratic theory concerns whether we can explain democratic legitimacy purely with reference to the intrinsic value of the public affirmation of equality, or whether we must invoke extra-democratic epistemic standards to do so. The freedom side of democracy is ignored or even rejected in this debate. But in order to understand the intrinsic value of democracy, we cannot ignore the relationship between freedom and democracy. Moreover, the freedom argument can better respond to the epistemic challenge to intrinsic accounts than can the equality argument. However, the freedom argument for democracy must be refined to avoid important objections to the idea that democracy can make citizens self-governing. The proposed freedom argument is based on notions of autonomy and freedom that have their root in the relational norm of not having another person as a master.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - debate

U2 - 10.1111/1467-8675.12159

DO - 10.1111/1467-8675.12159

M3 - Journal article

VL - 22

SP - 267

EP - 278

JO - Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory

JF - Constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory

SN - 1351-0487

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 122335120