Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians: The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians : The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence. / Pedersen, Rasmus Tue; Hansen, Kristina Jessen; Pedersen, Lene Holm.

In: International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 34, No. 1, edab034, 2022.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Pedersen, RT, Hansen, KJ & Pedersen, LH 2022, 'Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians: The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence', International Journal of Public Opinion Research, vol. 34, no. 1, edab034. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab034

APA

Pedersen, R. T., Hansen, K. J., & Pedersen, L. H. (2022). Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians: The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 34(1), [edab034]. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab034

Vancouver

Pedersen RT, Hansen KJ, Pedersen LH. Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians: The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence. International Journal of Public Opinion Research. 2022;34(1). edab034. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edab034

Author

Pedersen, Rasmus Tue ; Hansen, Kristina Jessen ; Pedersen, Lene Holm. / Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians : The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence. In: International Journal of Public Opinion Research. 2022 ; Vol. 34, No. 1.

Bibtex

@article{557d8080765344b2a33d861009b2c05b,
title = "Citizens{\textquoteright} Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians: The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence",
abstract = "Citizens value competence in politicians. However, while offering high pay is a key strategy when recruiting competent candidates in the job market, most citizens are highly averse to paying politicians higher salaries. We argue that this aversion arises from one fundamental concern among citizens: self-interested politicians. Using data from a large-scale preregistered survey experiment, we show that citizens are affected by the argument that higher salaries may attract self-interested politicians, whereas they are not affected by the argument that higher salaries will attract competent politicians. Surprisingly, the more positively citizens view politicians, the more they are affected by the argument about self-interested politicians. These results suggest that citizens may view modest salaries as a guard against self-interested politicians",
author = "Pedersen, {Rasmus Tue} and Hansen, {Kristina Jessen} and Pedersen, {Lene Holm}",
year = "2022",
doi = "10.1093/ijpor/edab034",
language = "English",
volume = "34",
journal = "International Journal of Public Opinion Research",
issn = "0954-2892",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians

T2 - The Risk of Self-Interest Matter More Than the Promise of Competence

AU - Pedersen, Rasmus Tue

AU - Hansen, Kristina Jessen

AU - Pedersen, Lene Holm

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - Citizens value competence in politicians. However, while offering high pay is a key strategy when recruiting competent candidates in the job market, most citizens are highly averse to paying politicians higher salaries. We argue that this aversion arises from one fundamental concern among citizens: self-interested politicians. Using data from a large-scale preregistered survey experiment, we show that citizens are affected by the argument that higher salaries may attract self-interested politicians, whereas they are not affected by the argument that higher salaries will attract competent politicians. Surprisingly, the more positively citizens view politicians, the more they are affected by the argument about self-interested politicians. These results suggest that citizens may view modest salaries as a guard against self-interested politicians

AB - Citizens value competence in politicians. However, while offering high pay is a key strategy when recruiting competent candidates in the job market, most citizens are highly averse to paying politicians higher salaries. We argue that this aversion arises from one fundamental concern among citizens: self-interested politicians. Using data from a large-scale preregistered survey experiment, we show that citizens are affected by the argument that higher salaries may attract self-interested politicians, whereas they are not affected by the argument that higher salaries will attract competent politicians. Surprisingly, the more positively citizens view politicians, the more they are affected by the argument about self-interested politicians. These results suggest that citizens may view modest salaries as a guard against self-interested politicians

U2 - 10.1093/ijpor/edab034

DO - 10.1093/ijpor/edab034

M3 - Journal article

VL - 34

JO - International Journal of Public Opinion Research

JF - International Journal of Public Opinion Research

SN - 0954-2892

IS - 1

M1 - edab034

ER -

ID: 291127534