Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment

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Standard

Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations : evidence from a conjoint experiment. / Pedersen, Mogens Jin; Favero, Nathan; Park, Joohyung.

I: Public Management Review , 09.08.2023.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Pedersen, MJ, Favero, N & Park, J 2023, 'Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment', Public Management Review . https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841

APA

Pedersen, M. J., Favero, N., & Park, J. (2023). Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment. Public Management Review . https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841

Vancouver

Pedersen MJ, Favero N, Park J. Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment. Public Management Review . 2023 aug. 9. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841

Author

Pedersen, Mogens Jin ; Favero, Nathan ; Park, Joohyung. / Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations : evidence from a conjoint experiment. I: Public Management Review . 2023.

Bibtex

@article{a123deb83990436ba7dff5bbe2a2a3d0,
title = "Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment",
abstract = "Does pay-for-performance–a hotly debated compensation scheme for incentivizing public service efficiency–induce inadvertent heterogeneity in job attraction that is counteracting the prospects of bureaucratic diversity and representation? Using data from a pre-registered conjoint experiment among US residents (n = 1,501), we examine whether pay-for-performance (compared to fixed pay) affects attraction to a public service job differently across race, gender, and age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that pay-for-performance does not diminish attraction to a public service job within or between demographic groups. In fact, we find indications that pay-for-performance may enhance job attractiveness among individuals identifying with minority racial groups.",
keywords = "equity, pay-for-performance, recruitment, representative bureaucracy, survey experiment, recruitment, pay-for-performance, representative bureaucracy, equity, survey experiment",
author = "Pedersen, {Mogens Jin} and Nathan Favero and Joohyung Park",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.",
year = "2023",
month = aug,
day = "9",
doi = "10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841",
language = "English",
journal = "Public Management Review",
issn = "1471-9037",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis Online",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations

T2 - evidence from a conjoint experiment

AU - Pedersen, Mogens Jin

AU - Favero, Nathan

AU - Park, Joohyung

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

PY - 2023/8/9

Y1 - 2023/8/9

N2 - Does pay-for-performance–a hotly debated compensation scheme for incentivizing public service efficiency–induce inadvertent heterogeneity in job attraction that is counteracting the prospects of bureaucratic diversity and representation? Using data from a pre-registered conjoint experiment among US residents (n = 1,501), we examine whether pay-for-performance (compared to fixed pay) affects attraction to a public service job differently across race, gender, and age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that pay-for-performance does not diminish attraction to a public service job within or between demographic groups. In fact, we find indications that pay-for-performance may enhance job attractiveness among individuals identifying with minority racial groups.

AB - Does pay-for-performance–a hotly debated compensation scheme for incentivizing public service efficiency–induce inadvertent heterogeneity in job attraction that is counteracting the prospects of bureaucratic diversity and representation? Using data from a pre-registered conjoint experiment among US residents (n = 1,501), we examine whether pay-for-performance (compared to fixed pay) affects attraction to a public service job differently across race, gender, and age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that pay-for-performance does not diminish attraction to a public service job within or between demographic groups. In fact, we find indications that pay-for-performance may enhance job attractiveness among individuals identifying with minority racial groups.

KW - equity

KW - pay-for-performance

KW - recruitment

KW - representative bureaucracy

KW - survey experiment

KW - recruitment

KW - pay-for-performance

KW - representative bureaucracy

KW - equity

KW - survey experiment

U2 - 10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841

DO - 10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85167655087

JO - Public Management Review

JF - Public Management Review

SN - 1471-9037

ER -

ID: 369988878